Towards proving type safety of .NET CIL  by Fruja, Nicu G.
Science of Computer Programming 72 (2008) 176–219
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Science of Computer Programming
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/scico
Towards proving type safety of .NET CIL
Nicu G. Fruja
Swiss International Air Lines Ltd., P.O. Box CH-8058, Zurich-Airport, Switzerland
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 20 May 2007
Received in revised form 24 May 2008
Accepted 26 May 2008
Available online 5 June 2008
Keywords:
Type safety
Bytecode verification
CLR
CIL
.NET
Operational semantics
Virtual machines
Security
a b s t r a c t
A crucial role in the Microsoft .NET Framework Common Language Runtime (CLR) security
model is played by type safety of the Common Intermediate Language (CIL). In this paper,
we formally prove type safety of a large subset of CIL. To do so, we begin by specifying the
static and dynamic semantics of CIL by providing an abstract interpreter for CIL programs.
We then formalize the bytecode verification algorithm, whose job it is to compute a well-
typing for a given method. We then prove type safety of well-typed methods, i.e., the
execution according to the semantics model of legal and well-typed methods does not
lead to any run-time type violations. Finally, to prove CIL’s type safety, we show that the
verification algorithm is sound, i.e., the typings it produces are well-typings, and complete,
i.e., if a well-typing exists, then the algorithm computes one.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Microsoft .NET Framework CLR (or Common Language Runtime), approved as a standard by ECMA International [1],
has been designed from the ground up as a target execution platform for a wide variety of languages, called .NET compliant
languages. A non-comprehensive list of programming languages compiling to CIL (or Common Intermediate Language,
the CLR’s native program language) ranges from object-oriented languages, like C], Visual Basic, Managed C++, Eiffel [2],
Smalltalk, Spec], and Active Oberon, to functional programming languages, like Haskell [3], Scheme [4], Mercury [5], and
AsmL [6], and from pure procedural programming languages, like COBOL and Modula 2, to scripting languages, like JScript,
Perl, and Python. At the time of this writing, there are 53 .NET compliant languages (see [7] for an up-to-date list). The CLR
makes possible cross-language compatibility, i.e., .NET components can interact with each other regardless of the languages
they are written in. Due to the wide spectrum of .NET compliant languages, the CLR is required to support various features,
such as, tail method calls, pointers (including method pointers), typed references, and a unified type system with boxing and
unboxing.
As programs have becomemore dynamic and distributed, operating systems and browsers have been required to execute
downloaded or mobile code. This execution can be problematic in the presence of malicious programs, intended to cause
mischief when executed on unsuspect hosts. As the CLR has been designed to be suitable for the development of a variety
of applications, ranging from web services to web and Windows applications, CIL’s type safety, central to the notion of
safe code execution within the CLR, is crucial. Executing non-type-safe bytecode programs on the CLR, regardless whether
the bytecode was accidentally or maliciously created, can produce erroneous or destructive behavior within the execution
system. It is worth mentioning that CIL’s type safety also includes checks other than just type constraints, such as, for
example, prohibition of stack underflow/overflow and object initialization.
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To ensure type safety, the CLR employs a conservative static analysis, called bytecode verification, that performs several
consistency checks before the bytecode is executed. Bytecode verification rejects, for example, a CIL program that performs
operations on values ofwrong types, accesses an uninitialized object, calls amethodwith an incorrect number of parameters,
calls a method with a parameter of an incorrect type or executes a method which returns a value of an incorrect type. The
checks are not limited to type checks – bytecode verification prohibits bytecode programs that jump to an invalid code
index. Bytecode verification is conservative, meaning that not only all the faulty programs are rejected, but also programs
that would never exhibit a run-time type error. This is unavoidable since the set of CIL programs that exhibit a run-time
type error is undecidable; furthermore, precision is traded for efficiency.
As type safety is the basis of the CLR security model, it is desirable to rigorously prove CIL’s type safety. In this paper,
we prove type safety of a large subset of CIL. To formally do this, we begin with specifying the static and dynamic semantics
of the CLR bytecode language by providing an abstract interpreter which executes arbitrary bytecode programs. We then
formally define the structural and type consistency checks performed by bytecode verification. On top of the type checks,
we provide a definition of well-typed methods and of the bytecode verification algorithm. We will be using throughout the
paper two terminologies: bytecode verification algorithm referring to the algorithm itself and bytecode verification referring
to the structural and type consistency checks.
We then prove type safety of well-typed methods, i.e., the execution according to the semantics model of legal and well-
typed methods does not lead to any run-time type violations and leaves the program in a good state, where certain structural
constraintshold. Finally, to prove CIL’s type safety,we show that the verification algorithm is sound, i.e., themethods accepted
by the verification are well-typed, and complete, i.e., the well-typed methods are accepted by the verification.
Besides formally proving type safety of a large subset of CIL, this paper reveals an important number of relevant
ambiguities in the official specification of CLR [1] and, in certain cases, even the absence of a specification at all. Thus, we
identify and fill several gaps in [1]. We also point out a series of inconsistencies between different implementations of the
CLR and the official specification [1]. Moreover, many explanations presented in this paper, alongside the specifications [1],
provide the rationale behind the design, that is often missing from the official specification.
1.1. Features omitted from CIL
As the goal of this paper is CIL’s type safety, besides omitting the unverifiable code, the analysis presented here also
abstracts as much as possible from everything that does not concern type safety. Moreover, the bytecode language that we
consider does not include static members,1 exceptions, arrays, generics, and threads. Apart from exceptions and generics, the
omitted features (e.g., overloading) only contribute to the complexity of the system through the number of additional cases
they introduce, but they do not introduce any challenging problems. Exceptions and generics are dealt with in two separate
papers [9,10] that extend –more precisely, refine – the analysis of this paper. Furthermore, we omit assemblies and dynamic
loading as their treatment is orthogonal to the study of this paper.
1.2. Abstract state machines
For the semantics model and the specification of the type-consistency checks performed by the verifier, we use the
framework of Abstract State Machines (ASMs) [11]. Since the intuitive understanding of the ASM language as pseudo-code
over abstract data structures is sufficient for the comprehension of the specifications in this paper, we will not repeat
the formal definition of ASMs given by [11]. However, for the reader’s convenience, we summarize the most important
concepts and notations that are used in the ASMs throughout this paper. An abstract state of an ASM is given by a set of
dynamic functions. Nullary dynamic functions correspond to ordinary state variables. Formally, all functions are total. They
may, however, return the special element undef if they are not defined at an argument. In each step, the machine updates
in parallel some of the functions at certain arguments. The updates are programmed using transition rules P , Q with the
following meaning:
skip do nothing
f (s) := t update f at s to t
if ϕ then P else Q if ϕ, then execute P , else execute Q
P Q execute P and Q in parallel
forall x with ϕ do P(x) execute P(x) in parallel for each x satisfying ϕ
choose x in A do P(x) choose an arbitrary x from the set A and then execute P(x)
import x do P(x) allocate a new element x, and then execute P(x)
let x = t in P assign t to x, and then execute P
P seq Q execute P , and then execute Q
P where Q execute P , assuming the abbreviations prescribed by Q .
1 However, we still consider four static methods: entrypoint, i.e., the method that is executed when the code is first run, and for handling delegates,
three static methods declared by the class System.Delegate [8].
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Both the ASM semanticsmodel and the ASM specification of the verifier have been validated. The correspondingmodels have
been refined, made executable by means of an implementation in AsmL [6], and then validated by their simulations [12,13].
1.3. Notational conventions
In the paper, besides the list operations, e.g., top, length, · (the append operation), we use several other list operations:
• pop(L) returns the list Lwithout the last element.
• push(L, x) is the result of the pushing x to the right of the list L, e.g., the list L · [x].
• take(L, n) returns the list consisting of the last n elements of list L.
• drop(L, n) returns the list resulting from dropping the last n elements from list L.
• split(L, n) splits off the last n elements of list L. More exactly, split(L, n) is the pair (L′, L′′), where L′ · L′′ = L and
length(L′′) = n.
• L[y/x] yields the list obtained by replacing all occurrences of x by y in list L.
• L vsuf L′ is true if the lists L and L′ of lengths m and n, respectively, and the relationv satisfy the following conditions:
m ≥ n and L(m− n+ i) v L′(i), for every i = 0, n− 1.
• L vlen L′ is true if the lists L and L′ of lengths m and n, respectively, and the relation v satisfy the following conditions:
m = n and L(i) v L′(i), for every i = 0,m− 1.
• L ∈suf L is true if the list L and the set of lists L satisfy the following condition: There exists a list L′ ∈ L such that
L vsuf L′.
• L ∈len L is true if the lists L and the set of lists L satisfy the following condition: There exists a list L′ ∈ L such that
L vlen L′.
• sublist(L, L′) is true if the list L is a sublist of list L′. More exactly, sublist(L, L′) holds if there exist two lists L′′ and L′′′ such
that L′′ · L · L′′′ = L′.
• last(L, L′) is true if the last occurrence of list L in list L′ is at the beginning of L′. More precisely, last(L, L′) holds if for
every two lists L′′ and L′′′ such that L′′ · L · L′′′ = L′, it holds L′′ = [ ].
• prefix(L, L′) returns the sublist of list L′ before the last occurrence of L in L′. More exactly, prefix(L, L′) = L′′ if there exists
a list L′′′ such that last(L, L · L′′′) and L′′ · L · L′′′ = L′.
• suffix(L, L′) returns the sublist of list L′ after the last occurrence of the list L in L′. More precisely, suffix(L, L′) = L′′ if
last(L, L · L′′) and there exists a list L′′′ such that L′′′ · L · L′′ = L′.
1.4. Plan of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An informal overview of the considered CIL subset and its type system is
provided in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 define the structure and dynamics of the ASM interpreter for CIL programs. Bytecode
verification checks are described and formally defined in Section 5. The bytecode verification algorithm and the definition
of well-typed methods are given in Section 6. Section 7 introduces the typing rules and proves type safety of the considered
subset of CIL. The relatedwork is discussed in Section 8. Section 9 gives directions for future work, and Section 10 concludes.
2. An overview of the analyzed CLR and its type system
The CLR is an abstract stack-based machine, with automatic memory management, for CIL bytecode programs. It
encompasses a managed heap, for storing objects, and a stack for method calls, for capturing information, in the form of
frames, about the active method executions.
A new frame is put on the frame stack every time a method is called. Such a frame comprises a program counter, any
local variables, a local memory pool (that serves as a home for value class instances created on the evaluation stack using the
bytecode instruction NewObj), the arguments passed to the method (if any), and an evaluation stack (for intermediate results
of the method’s computations).
A method body is a list of bytecode instructions. The instructionsmanipulate the heap, the local variables, the arguments,
and the evaluation stack. Basically, there are three kinds of instructions: instructions that load values onto the evaluation
stack, instructions that store values from the evaluation stack into memory locations, and instructions formethod calls.
In the rest of this section, we give a detailed informal description of the two kinds of types supported by the CLR type
system – reference types (Section 2.1) and value types (Section 2.2) – and of the CLR’s tail calls (Section 2.3).
2.1. Reference types
The CLR supports reference types such as object classes, interfaces, pointers, and delegates. A value of a reference type is
always allocated on the managed heap.
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.class private sealed DC extends System.Delegate
{
.method public instance void .ctor(object o, native intm) runtime managed
{
} // end of method DC::.ctor
.method public instance T Invoke(T 1 x1,. . . ,T n xn) runtime managed
{
} // end of method DC::Invoke
} // end of class DC
Fig. 1. The general form of delegate classes.
Object classes. An object class is a reference type of a ‘‘self-describing’’ value, i.e., a value whose representation and
applicable operations are unambiguously defined. The object classes, supporting for example the C], J], or Smalltalk classes,
can declare instance fields and instancemethods (virtual and non-virtual). A value of an object class, also known as an object
class instance, can be referred to by object references and can be created with a constructor. The constructors are special
methods, named .ctor.
Interfaces. Unlike the object classes which fully describe their values, interfaces are reference types that are only a partial
description. Specifically, an interface cannot declare fields and methods for the values of the interface, i.e., it cannot define
instance fields and non-virtual instance methods. However, an interface can declare (abstract) virtual methods.
Pointers. The CLR supports two kinds of pointers:managed pointers andmethod pointers. The CLR also supports unmanaged
pointers. However, since their use is deemed unverifiable, this paper does not consider them.
A managed pointer is a reference to a managed memory block: Concretely, it can point to an instance of a value type, a
field of an object, or a field of a value type instance. Unlike a reference to an object class instance, a managed pointer can
point to the interior of the instance (e.g., to an instance field), rather than to point to the ‘‘entry’’ of the instance. Usually,
managed pointers are generated for method arguments that are passed ‘‘by-reference’’, e.g., the C] ref/out parameters. The
CLR provides two type-safe operations onmanaged pointer types: loading a value from (operation known as ‘‘indirect load’’)
and writing a value (operation known as ‘‘indirect store’’) to the address referenced by a pointer.2
A key ingredient in the type safety proof, identifying the typing rules for pointers, is fairly complex.
A method pointer is a pointer to a method entry point. It reliably identifies the method assigned to the pointer. Thus,
if one knows the method entry point, one can determine, for example, the method signature, the return type,3 the local
variable types. Therefore, one can see a method pointer as a method identifier. This identifier can be regarded as pointing
to an address or directly to the corresponding method reference. The only operations on method pointers are the call of a
method via the correspondingmethod pointer and the creation of delegates. As bytecode verification does not trackmethod
pointer types, the first operation, also known as indirect call, is regarded as unverifiable by [1] and therefore not considered
for our analysis.
Delegate classes. The delegates were built with the idea of being the verifiable method pointers. Informally, a delegate
wraps a list of method pointers and corresponding target objects called invocation list. The methods pointed to in the
invocation list can be invoked sequentially, in the order inwhich they appear through adelegate call.More formally, a delegate
is simply an instance of a delegate class. Fig. 1 shows the (simplified) general form of a delegate class. A delegate class is an
object class whose definition obeys certain conditions:
• It should be declared as a sealed4 subclass of System.Delegate.
• It should declare exactly twomembers: a .ctor and a method Invoke. As the implementations of these twomethods are
provided by the run-time environment, the methods should have empty bodies.
– The .ctor should have exactly two parameters: the first of type object and the second of type native int (see
Section 2.2 for details on this type). When the constructor is invoked, the first argument – known as target object
– is an instance of the class that declares the target method or one of its subclasses, and the second argument is a
method pointer to the method – known as target method – to be invoked. The second parameter of the .ctor should
be of type native int. This is so since the method pointers are regarded as values of the type native int.
– The Invokemethod should have the signature compatiblewith the target method.
Each call to an Invokemethod of a delegate class is turned into a synchronous call of themethods pointed to in the invocation
list. That the target method and Invoke do not necessarily have the same signature might be problematic in ensuring type
2 Throughout this paper,weuse the terminology ‘‘the address referenced by a pointer’’ interchangeablywith ‘‘thememory block referenced by a pointer’’.
3 In CLR, the signature of a method reference does not include the method return type.
4 A sealed CIL class cannot be inherited.
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safety, and therefore the definition of compatible signatures requires attention. By only allowing twomethods, the delegates
can be more easily verified. Because the target object and the target method are passed to the delegate constructor, there
exists the information to ensure that run-time (type) errors caused bymismatchedparameters and return types donot occur.
However, specifying the delegates semantics is not an easy task because of their ‘‘opaque’’ implementation: both the creation
and invocation of a delegate are accomplished through methods whose bodies, assumed to be empty, are automatically
generated by the run-time system. As for the creation of a delegate instance, there are also verification rules imposing a
certain bytecode sequence.
2.2. Value types
The value types supported by the CLR are the primitive types and the value classes. Unlike the values of reference types,
the values of a value type are usually allocated ‘‘in place’’, i.e., on the evaluation stack. A value type can also be allocated on
the heap, but only within (e.g., as a field of) an object class instance.
Primitive types. Weconsider only the following primitive types: int32, int64, float64, and native int. The type native int
is mapped at run-time to the natural size of the specific architecture: int32 on a 32-bits architecture and int64 on a 64-bits
architecture. It is useful for efficiency when the target machine architecture is not known until run-time.
Value classes. The value classes are the CLR support for C] structs, C++ structs, and Pascal and Modula 2 record types.
A value class is a value type whose values are ‘‘self-contained’’ values. More exactly, these values – also known as instances
of the value class – are represented as mappings assigning values to the instance fields of the value class. Every value class
should have the library object class System.ValueType [14] as the direct base class. In particular, it is not possible for a value
class to extend another value class. Additionally, a value class can implement one or more interfaces. Similarly to an object
class, a value class can declare instance fields. It can only declare non-virtual instance methods.
To fill the gap between value types and reference types, i.e., to have an unified type system, the CLR supports two special
operations called boxing and unboxing. Through boxing, a copy of a value type instance can be ‘‘packed’’ in an object on the
heap, along with the necessary internal data required to create a valid reference object. The inverse process, i.e., converting
a reference type to a value type, is called unboxing. An unboxing ‘‘back’’ to a value type returns a managed pointer to the
value boxed in the object if the object is indeed a boxed value of the given value type.
A non-virtual method receives a this pointer that is a managed pointer (see below the pointer types) to the (unboxed)
value class. One fundamental difference between value classes and object classes is that the former do not inherit behavior,
and therefore cannot declare virtual methods. However, virtual methods defined by System.ValueType and by the interfaces
implemented by a value class (if any) can be called on that value class’ instances, but only if the instances are boxed. This
makes sense since the value types have identity only when boxed.
System.TypedReference [15] is a special value class in the .NET Base Class Library. This class’ instances are known as
typed references. They enable the CLR to provide C++-style support for methods that have a variable number of arguments.
Specifically, they can be used to represent method arguments in variable argument lists. In general, the typed references
support languages that require ‘‘by-reference’’ passing of unboxed values to methods that are not statically restricted as to
the type of values they accept. Therefore, a typed reference is regarded as an opaque descriptor of a pointer and a type.
Example 2.1. Fig. 2 lists a C] example to illustrate the use of typed references. Each of the arguments x, y, and z of the
method WriteAtConsole is ‘‘packed’’ into a typed reference. As the declaration of WriteAtConsole does not have a list of
parameter types (so, it can have a variable number of arguments), the types of its arguments are determined from the
corresponding typed references. For example, the value class System.TypedReference defines a method GetTargetType that
‘‘extracts’’ the type information out of a typed reference.
Another major benefit, which is not illustrated in Example 2.1, is that one can pass arguments by reference without
any heap allocation. This aspect is important since if one allows heap allocation, then using objects is a more standard and
generally preferable approach.
2.3. Other features
As there are .NET compliant languages (e.g., Scheme [4], Haskell [3], Mercury [5,16]) where recursion is the only way to
express repetition, the CLR needs to support tail method calls. When executing a tail call, the CLR discards the caller’s frame
prior making the call. This means, for example, that a method which calls itself tail can implement a desired repetition.
Regarding type safety, the tail calls require attention because of twomain reasons. Firstly, because their execution results
in situations when the method invoked tail does not return to the (in the meantime discarded) frame that contained the tail
call, but to another frame. Secondly, because although a call is marked tail, it could happen that the tail prefix is ignored
when the bytecode is compiled by the JIT compiler (also known as ‘‘jitting’’), and consequently the call would be interpreted
as a non-tail call. The reason for that is because the JIT compiler views this prefix as an optional directive. However, it should
be ensured that the call is type safe, regardless of whether the call has been interpreted as tail or not. Ensuring type-safe
tail calls can be problematic especially in the presence of pointers, as the tail calls’ execution can easily generate dangling
pointers.
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// the arglist keyword represents
// a method with a variable number of arguments
public static voidWriteAtConsole( arglist )
{
// an ArgIterator object is used to loop through the arguments
ArgIterator iterator = new ArgIterator( arglist );
// each item in the ArgIterator object is a typed reference,
// which can be converted to an object using the
// static method TypedReference.ToObject()
while ( iterator .GetRemainingCount()> 0 )
{
TypedReference tr = iterator .GetNextArg();
Console.WriteLine ( TypedReference.ToObject(tr) );
}
}
// the Main method calls the method with
// a variable number of arguments
public static void Main()
{
// define arguments of different types
double z = 2.5;
int x = 31;
string y = ‘‘hello’’;
// call the variable argument method, passing
// the arguments in, using the arglist keyword
WriteAtConsole( arglist( x, y, z ) );
}
Fig. 2. Example: typed references and methods with variable number of arguments.
Table 1
CIL’s types
Universe of types Typical use
Type = RefType ∪ ValueType T , T ′ , T ′′ , T ′′′
RefType = ObjClass ∪ Interface ∪ PointerType –
ValueType = ValueClass ∪ PrimitiveType –
ObjClass OC , OC ′ , OC ′′
DelegateClass ⊆ ObjClass DC
Interface I
PointerType = {T& | T ∈ ReferentType} T&
ReferentType = ObjClass ∪ Interface ∪ ValueType –
ValueClass VC
PrimitiveType = {int32, int64, native int, float64} –
3. The structure of the ASM interpreter
The execution environment in which every method runs consists of the type hierarchy and the field and method
declarations. Table 1 defines the classification of the CIL’s types described in Section 2. We also denote by Class the set
of object classes and value classes:
Class = ObjClass ∪ ValueClass
We assume that the classes and interfaces are organized by the execution environment into an inheritance hierarchy, on
which the subtype relation defined in Definition 3.1 depends.
Definition 3.1 (Subtype Relation). The subtype relation is the least reflexive and transitive relation such that
• if T ∈ Class ∪ Interface and T ′ is object, or
• if T ∈ ValueType and T ′ is System.ValueType, or
• if T ∈ ObjClass and T ′ is a base class of T or an interface implemented by T , or
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Table 2
CIL’s values
Universe of values Typical use
Val = SimpleVal ∪ ObjRef ∪Map(FRef , Val)
∪ Adr ∪ TypedRef ∪MethPtr val, val′
SimpleVal –
ObjRef ref , ref ′ , ref ′′
Adr adr , adr ′ , adr ′′
TypedRef tr
MethPtr mp
Table 3
Environment specific universes
Universe Typical use Element name
Meth M Method names
MRef mref , T ::M , C::M Method references
Instr instr Bytecode instructions
Local = N n Local variables
Arg = N n Arguments
FRef C::F , OC::F , OC::F ′ , VC::F Field references
• if T ∈ Interface and T ′ is an interface implemented by T , or
• if T ∈ ValueType and T ′ is an interface implemented by T ,
then T  T ′.
The possible kinds of values corresponding to the CIL’s types are gathered in Table 2. Thus, a value can be
• a simple value, element of the universe SimpleVal, i.e., a 32-bit integer, a 64-bit integer, a native size integer, or a 64-bit
floating point number, or
• an object reference, element of the universe ObjRef , or
• a value class instance, element ofMap(FRef , Val), defined as a mapping assigning values to the instance fields of the value
class, or
• a pointer (referencing an address), element of the universe Adr , or
• a typed reference, element of TypedRef , or
• amethod pointer, element ofMethPtr .5
Each class declares types for a set of instance fields, and each class and interface specifies signatures and return types
for a set of instance methods. Every method consists of a list of bytecode instructions. Formally, we consider the universes
in Table 3 and the environment components in Table 4 defined as basic static functions.
Remark 3.1. Throughout the paper, we implicitly assume that we only deal with legal CIL programs, i.e., programs that
satisfy well-formedness conditions in the form of structural properties (typically ensured by bytecode verification in a
preliminary step). In particular,we assumeawell-formed class table, acyclicity of the inheritance graph,well-formed classes,
well-formed methods, well-formed field and method lookup.
The list of instructions of a method body is maintained in code. Thus, the instruction with the code index pos of the
methodmref is given by code(mref )(pos). The abstract bytecode instructions of the bytecode language that we consider are
given in Table 8. They are constructors for real CIL instructions:One abstract instructionmodels one ormore real instructions.
If omitted in a static or dynamic function, the method reference is considered to be themethod of the currently executed
frame. For example, code(pos) denotes the instruction with code index pos in the current method.
The local variable types are declared and fixed. They are maintained in the local signature, denoted by locTypes. In the
verifiable code, the local variables are assumed to be initialized to default values according to their type. The goal is to
simplify bytecode verification. Due to this decision, bytecode verification does not need to perform a definite assignment
analysis.
For every method, the function paramTypes yields the list of parameter types given in the method signature. The list
returned by paramTypes does not include the type of the this pointer used for instancemethods. Therefore, we consider the
derived function argTypes : Map(MRef , List(Type))which also includes the type of the this pointer.6 For a method declared
by an object class (or interface), the this pointer is of the class (or interface) type, whereas if the class of the method is a
value class, the this pointer is a pointer to an instance of the value class.
5 As the use of amethod pointer is very limited, we see themethod pointers as elements of the universeMethPtr that point to the correspondingmethod
references.
6 Every time our model exceptionally considers a static method, we make an exception and consider argTypes to coincide with paramTypes.
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Table 4
The components of the execution environment
Function definition Function name
code : Map(MRef , List(Instr)) Method code
locTypes : Map(MRef , List(Type)) Local variable types
paramTypes : Map(MRef , List(Type)) Parameter types
retType : Map(MRef , Type ∪ {void}) Method return type
classNm : Map(MRef , Class) Method class name
methNm : Map(MRef ,Meth) Method name
instFields : Map(Class,P (FRef )) Instance fields of a class
fieldType : Map(FRef , Type) Field declared type
Table 5
Semantics specific universes
Universe Typical use Element name
TagType – Tag type
Op op Operator
Frame fr , fr ′ , fr1, . . . frk Call frame
Pc pos, pos′ , pos′′ Program counter
InitState – Object initialization status
Switch – Execution mode
Table 6
The basic static functions
Function definition Function name
tagType : Map(Val, TagType) Value’s tag
opNo : Map(Op,N) Operator’s arity
opResVal : Map(Op× List(Val), Val) Result of an operation
opResType : Map(Op× List(Type), Type) Result type of an operation
handleOf : Map(Type, Val) Handle associated with a type
Definition 3.2. For a method T ::M , we define
argTypes(T ::M) =
{[T ] · paramTypes(T ::M), if T ∈ ObjClass ∪ Interface;
[T&] · paramTypes(T ::M), if T ∈ ValueClass.
We denote by locNo : Map(MRef ,N) and argNo : Map(MRef ,N) the length of locTypes and argTypes, respectively. The
return type, the class name, and the name of amethod reference are selected by retType, classNm, andmethNm, respectively.
The set of the fields of a class (including the inherited fields) is maintained in instFields. The declared type of any instance
field is recorded by fieldType.
Besides the execution environment, the ASM interpreter’s structure also comprises the universes in Table 5 and the basic
static functions in Table 6.
The values carry their associated CLR types. Any value can be viewed as a pair consisting of the value and a tag representing
its CLR type (andnot the type trackedbybytecode verification). The set of tags is denotedby TagType and is defined as follows:
TagType = PrimitiveType ∪ ValueClass ∪ {ref,&, typedref}
Given a value, the function tagType yields the tag type associated with the value.
The stack frames, also known as activation records, are defined as elements of the universe Frame. Every frame is given
as a 6-tuple comprising a program counter, local variable addresses, addresses allocated in the local memory pool, argument
addresses, an evaluation stack, and a method reference.
Frame = Pc ×Map(Local, Adr)× P (Adr × ValueClass)×Map(Arg, Adr)× List(Val)
Bytecode verification has to ensure that all objects are properly initialized before they are used. To make object
initialization accessible to the type safety proof, the semantics model has to be designed in such a way that programs
which do not properly initialize objects can be identified. In other words, the run-time representation of partially initialized
objects must be distinguishable from that of (fully) initialized objects. For this purpose, we consider the universe InitState.
The initialization status and the run-time type of object references are recorded as elements of InitState. An object reference
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whose run-time type is an object class can be either partially initialized, i.e., its initialization is in progress, or initialized. An
object reference whose run-time type is a value type can only be initialized.
InitState = InProgress(ObjClass) initialization in progress
| Init(ObjClass ∪ ValueType) initialization done
Given an operator, the function opNo returns the number of operands necessary to perform the operation indicated
by the operator. The resulting value of an operation and the resulting verification type can be determined through the
functions opResVal and opResType, respectively.While opResVal is a ‘‘semantics’’ function, opResType is definedby [1, Partition
III, Section 1.5].
The RefAnyType instruction applied with a type token argument T returns a handle, i.e., an opaque descriptor,
associated with T . For a type T , we assume that handleOf (T ) returns a handle, i.e., an instance of the special value class
System.RuntimeTypeHandle [17], corresponding to T .
The below defined universe Switch depicts the possible execution modes of the operational semantics model CLRL
defined in Section 4.
Switch = Noswitch normal execution mode
| Invoke(Bool,MRef , List(Val)) method invocation mode
| Result(List(Val)) method returning mode
The model is either in the normal execution mode, i.e., it executes an instruction, or in the method invocation mode, i.e.,
it invokes a method with a given list of arguments, or in the method returning mode, i.e., it returns from a method possibly
with a return value.
We define the following derived static functions: defVal : Map(RefType ∪ ValueType, Val) and lookUp : Map((ObjClass ∪
ValueType) × MRef ,MRef ). Given a type T , defVal(T ) is the default value, also known as ‘‘zero’’, associated with the type T .
Note that the default value of a value class is the result of initializing each instance field of the class to its default value.
Definition 3.3 (Default Value). For a type T ∈ RefType ∪ ValueType, we define
defVal(T ) =

0, if T ∈ PrimitiveType \ {float64};
0.0d, if T = float64;
null, if T ∈ RefType;
{T ::F 7→ defVal(fieldType(T ::F)) |
T ::F ∈ instFields(T )}, if T ∈ ValueClass.
Remark 3.2. The recursive definition of defVal is well-founded in any case, in the sense that there is no type T such that
defVal(T ) is defined in terms of defVal(T ) itself. This is justified in particular by the key fact that a struct cannot be recursive,
i.e., the declaration of a value class VC is not allowed to use the name VC in the types of its instance fields.
A virtual method call is resolved dynamically, i.e., at run-time. More exactly, the method to be invoked at run-time is
determined based on the type of the object themethod is called on.7 This is known as dynamic method binding [1, Partition II,
Section 15.2], andDefinition 3.4 specifies it as a derived function lookUp : Map(Type×MRef ,MRef ). Thus, given the run-time
type T (see the definition in Section 4) of an object and a virtual method T ′::M , lookUp(T , T ′::M) yields the method T ′′::M ,
where T ′′::M is the first implementation of T ′::M declared by a supertype of T , starting with T itself.
Definition 3.4 (Method Lookup). For an object class or value type T and a method T ′::M , we define
lookUp(T , T ′::M) =
if T declares a non-abstractmethodM ∧
((T = T ′) ∨ (T ′ ∈ ObjClass ⇒ T ::M overrides T ′::M)) ∧
(T ′ ∈ Interface ⇒ T ::M implements T ′::M)
then T ::M
elseif T = object then undef
else lookUp(T ′′, T ′::M)where T ′′ is the direct base class of T
7 Thus, the method argument of a virtual call is called, whereas the method selected for the run-time execution is invoked. For non-virtual call cases, we
use the two notions interchangeably.
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Table 7
The basic dynamic functions
Function definition Function name
mem : Map(Adr, Val ∪ {undef }) Memory function
frameStack : List(Frame) Stack of call frames
pc : Pc Current program counter
locAdr : Map(Local, Adr) Local variable addresses
locPool : P (Adr × ValueClass) Local memory pool
argAdr : Map(Arg, Adr) Argument addresses
evalStack : List(Val) Evaluation stack
meth : MRef Current method
fieldAdr : Map((ObjRef ∪ Adr)× FRef , Adr) Instance field addresses
initState : Map(ObjRef , InitState) Initialization status
addressOf : Map(ObjRef , Adr) Boxed value address
typedRefAdr : Map(TypedRef , Adr) Typed reference address
typedRefType : Map(TypedRef , Type) Typed reference type
methodOf : Map(MethPtr,MRef ) Method pointer method
invocationList : List(ObjRef ×MRef ) Invocation list of a delegate
switch : Switch Current execution mode
The implementations of virtual methods declared by a class can be overridden in methods of derived classes and
value classes.8 Also, the (virtual) methods declared by an interface have to be implemented in classes or value classes
that implement the interface. The following conditions should be satisfied when a method overrides/implements another
method:
[override/implement] If T ::M ∈ MRef overrides/implements T ′::M ∈ MRef , then:
(at) argNo(T ::M) = argNo(T ′::M) and for every i = 1, argNo(T ::M)− 1,
argTypes(T ::M)(i) = argTypes(T ′::M)(i)
(rt) retType(T ::M) = retType(T ′::M).
The instructions dealing directlywith pointers, i.e., LoadInd and StoreInd, require the addresses referenced by the pointers
to be valid. An address is a valid address if it not null, it is in the range of Adr , and it is ‘‘naturally aligned’’ for the target
architecture. To distinguish between invalid addresses and valid addresses, we define the external function validAdr :
Map(Adr, Bool) which, given an address, indicates the validity of the address. This function is external as its definition
depends on the target architecture. However, the addresses of local variables, arguments, fields and value type instances
inside boxed objects are regarded as valid.
Delegate classes. As the two methods declared by a delegate class are not allowed to have a body, the semantics model
should treat them specially. We proceed as follows. Every delegate’s .ctor is implemented via ASM rules.
Every delegate’s Invokemethod is provided with the body that expresses the sequentiality of the execution of delegate
invocation list elements: the body is obtained upon compiling, for example, a C] for loop which invokes, one after the
other, the methods in the delegate invocation list. To implement that body, we insert two more methods, implemented via
ASM rules, in every delegate class: The method length is defined to return the length of the delegate invocation list, while
invoke is used to invoke a certain method in the delegate invocation list. Thus, every delegate class is translated as shown
in Fig. 3 (for an Invokemethod with a non-void return type9).
So, basically, ourmodel considers the delegates implemented, in particular created, through ASM rules because their CLR
implementation is not transparent. This modelling decision has an impact on the members declared by System.Delegate,
whose implementation relies on the delegates implementation. Therefore, the implementation of these members should
be accomplished via ASM rules, too. A full specification of the CLR would consist of ASM rules for each member declared
by System.Delegate. As such an approach would significantly blow up the size of the exposition, in our formalization,
System.Delegate declares only three members, namely the static methods Combine, Remove, and op Equality.
4. The dynamics of the ASM interpreter
The dynamic state of the machine CLRL is given by the basic dynamic functions of Table 7.
The function mem is applied to read and to store values other than value class instances from and into the memory,
respectively. This function can return an undefined value. The stack of call frames frameStack is defined as a list of
frames. A call frame comprises a program counter pc , local variable addresses locAdr , local memory pool locPool, argument
addresses argAdr , an evaluation stack evalStack, and a method reference meth.
8 A value class can override the virtual methods declared by the classes System.ValueType and object.
9 For an Invokemethod with void as return type, the translation is similar.
186 N.G. Fruja / Science of Computer Programming 72 (2008) 176–219
.class private sealed DC extends System.Delegate
{
.method public instance void .ctor(object o, native intm) runtime managed
{
} // end of method DC::.ctor
.method public instance T Invoke(T 1 x1,. . . ,T n xn) runtime managed
{
} // end of method DC::Invoke
} // end of class DC
⇓
.class private sealed DC extends System.Delegate
{
.method public instance void .ctor(object o, native intm) runtime managed
{
} // end of method DC::.ctor
.method public instance T Invoke(T 1 x1, . . . , T n xn) cil managed
{
.maxstack n+2
.locals init (T result , int32 invListIdx)
0: br n+9
1: ldarg 0 // load the delegate instance
2: ldloc 1 // load the current index in the invocation list
3: ldarg 1 // load the first argument of the delegate call
...
n+2 : ldarg n // load the n-th argument of the delegate call
n+3 : call instance T DC:: invoke(int32, T 1, . . . , T n)
n+4 : stloc 0
n+5 : ldloc 1
n+6 : ldc.i4 1
n+7 : add
n+8 : stloc 1
n+9 : ldloc 1
n+10 : ldarg 0
n+11 : call instance int32 DC:: length()
n+12 : clt
n+13 : brtrue 1
n+14 : ldloc 0
n+15 : ret
} // end of method DC::Invoke
.method private instance int32 length() runtime managed
{
} // end of method DC:: length
.method private instance T invoke(int32 i,T 1 x1,. . . ,T n xn) runtime managed
{
} // end of method DC:: invoke
}
Fig. 3. The translation scheme of delegate classes.
The localmemory pool locPool is a (possibly empty) set that consists of pairs of the form (adr, T ), where adr is the address
of a memory block allocated for an instance of a value class T . An address adr is considered in locPool in a single case: if
the address is allocated for a value class instance created upon a constructor invocation (see the semantics of the NewObj
instruction in Section 4.1). The memory allocated in the local memory pool is reclaimed upon method context termination
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(an address added to locPool for a given NewObj instruction execution is used only during this instruction execution).
Modelling the local memory pool is an important contribution of our formal specification. The reason behind modelling
this pool concerns the type safety proof, more precisely, the typing of pointers (see Remark 7.1 in Section 7).
The derived nullary function frame : Frame denotes the currently executed frame. It is determined as a 6-tuple consisting
of pc , locAdr , locPool, argAdr , evalStack, andmeth.
frame = (pc, locAdr, locPool, argAdr, evalStack,meth)
Accordingly, pc gives the program counter of the current frame, locAdr the local variable addresses of the current frame, etc.
To simplify the technical presentation, we separate the current frame from the stack of call frames, i.e., frame is not contained
in frameStack.
The function fieldAdr assigns to every instance field of a reference or of a value class instance stored at a given address
its allocated address. More precisely, the address of an instance field C::F of an object ref is given by fieldAdr(ref ,C::F ). Also,
the address of an instance field C::F of a value class instance stored at an address adr is fieldAdr(adr, C::F).
The function initState records the run-time type and the initialization status of the object references. Given an object
reference ref , if initState(ref ) is InProgress(T ), where T is an object class, themeaning is that the run-time type of ref is T , and
the initialization of ref is in progress. If initState(ref ) is Init(T ), the run-time type of ref is T , and ref is initialized. The values
of value types can be ‘‘boxed’’ in the heap and then addressed by object references. Such a reference is always considered
initialized. Formally, if ref is a boxed value of a value type T , then it always holds initState(ref ) = Init(T ).
To simplify the semantics rules’ exposition, we define the derived function actualTypeOf : Map(ObjRef , Type), which assigns
to every object reference its run-time type. Given a reference ref , actualTypeOf (ref ) = T , where T ∈ ObjClass ∪ ValueType,
if
initState(ref ) = InProgress(T ) or initState(ref ) = Init(T ).
A boxed value on the heap embeds the value type and a list of instance field addresses. When ‘‘unboxing’’ a ‘‘boxed’’
value, one needs its address on the heap. This address is maintained in addressOf , and it is set when the value is boxed (see
the semantics of the Box instruction in Section 4.1).
The function typedRefAdr returns the address embedded in a typed reference, while the type transmitted with a typed
reference is recorded by the function typedRefType. For amethod pointer,methodOf returns themethod reference pointed to
by the pointer. The invocation list each delegate instance is equipped with upon its creation is maintained by invocationList .
A delegate instance’s invocation list is immutable. The functionmethodOf is only accessed for initializing the invocationList
upon calling a delegate .ctor.
The current execution mode of the semantics model defined in Section 4.1 is maintained by switch.10
Initial constraints. For the initial state of CLRL, the following conditions are satisfied by the basic dynamic functions:
mem(adr) = undef , ∀ adr ∈ Adr fieldAdr = ∅
frameStack = [ ] initState = ∅
pc = 0 addressOf = ∅
locAdr = ∅ typedRefAdr = ∅
locPool = ∅ typedRefType = ∅
argAdr = ∅ methodOf = ∅
evalStack = [ ] invocationList = ∅
meth = .entrypoint switch = Noswitch
Asmem is applied to ‘‘read’’ from thememory only simple values and object references, we introduce a (derived) function
memVal : Map(Adr×Type, Val∪{undef }), which in addition ‘‘reads’’ value class values. The definition below ofmemVal relies
on the fact that the value class instances are defined as mappings. Thus, for an address adr and a type T ,memVal(adr, T ) is
the value stored in the memory block at adr , sufficient to hold values of type T .
Definition 4.1. For an address adr and a type T , we define
memVal(adr, T ) =
if T ∈ ValueClass then
{T ::F 7→ memVal(fieldAdr(adr, T ::F), fieldType(T ::F)) | T ::F ∈ instFields(T )}
else mem(adr)
10 The motivation for switch stems mainly from the easiness of integrating external method calls and the exception handling mechanism (see [9]).
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Definition 4.2. For an address adr , a type T and a value val, we define
WriteMem(adr, T , val) ≡
if T ∈ ValueClass then
forall T ::F ∈ instFields(T ) do
WriteMem(fieldAdr(adr, T ::F), fieldType(T ::F), val(T ::F))
else mem(adr) := val
Remark 4.1. The definitions ofmemVal andWriteMem are well-founded for a well-formed program as the declaration of a
value class cannot be recursive, i.e., it does not use the value class name in the types of its instance fields.
Obviously, after storing a value val at an address of a memory block, sufficient to hold values of a type T , the value read
from the memory block is val.
Lemma 4.1. AfterWriteMem(adr, T, val) is executed, memVal(adr, T) = val.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the possibly value class type T . 
To determine the local variable values and argument values of the current frame, we define the derived functions locVal :
Map(Local, Value) and argVal : Map(Arg, Value), respectively. The value of a local variable is determined as the value stored
in the memory block at the local variable address, sufficient to hold values of the local variable declared type. Similarly, the
value of an argument is determined in terms of the argument address and argument declared type.
locVal(n) = memVal(locAdr(n), locTypes(n)), for every n = 0, locNo(meth)− 1
argVal(n) = memVal(argAdr(n), argTypes(n)), for every n = 0, argNo(meth)− 1
4.1. The semantics of bytecode instructions
This section defines the effect of the instructions in Table 8 on the dynamic state of the virtual machine. The operational
semantics model – given in terms of the ASM interpreter named CLRL – executes the macro execScheme which is
parameterized by the submachines execCLR and switchCLR. This macro gives control to these submachines depending on
the current execution mode switch of the machine CLRL.
The macro execScheme is defined as follows. If switch is Noswitch, i.e., the machine is in the normal execution mode, then
execCLR defined in Figs. 4–6 takes control and executes the current instruction code(pc). If switch is not Noswitch, i.e., the
machine either invokes a method or returns from a method, execScheme gives control to the machine switchCLR defined in
Fig. 7.
CLRL ≡ execScheme(execCLR, switchCLR)
execScheme(execCLR, switchCLR) ≡
if switch = Noswitch then execCLR(code(pc))
else switchCLR
The operational semantics rules make extensive use of the macros defined and informally described in Table 9. The
definitions of these macros assume an infinite memory space Adr , an assumption that is often made when specifying the
semantics of programming languages.
We now describe the operational semantics rules for the instructions in Table 8.11 The Dup instruction duplicates the top
element of the stack, while the Pop instruction removes the top element from the evalStack. The instruction Const(T , lit)
pushes the constant (literal) lit , of type T , onto the stack.
The instruction LoadLoc(n) loads on the evalStack the value locVal(n) of the n-th local variable of the current
frame. The address locAdr(n) of the n-th local variable is pushed onto the stack by the instruction LoadLocA(n). The
instruction StoreLoc(n) stores withWriteMem the topmost value of evalStack at the variable address locAdr(n).
11We omit here the treatment of exceptional cases, e.g., evaluation stack underflow. All these cases are analyzed in [9] in the context of the exception
handling mechanism.
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execCLR(instr) ≡ match instr
Dup → let (evalStack′, [val]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
evalStack := evalStack′ · [val, val]
pc := pc + 1
Pop → let evalStack′ = pop(evalStack) in
evalStack := evalStack′
pc := pc + 1
Const( , lit) → evalStack := evalStack · [lit]
pc := pc + 1
LoadLoc(n) → evalStack := evalStack · [locVal(n)]
pc := pc + 1
StoreLoc(n) → let (evalStack′, [val]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
WriteMem(locAdr(n), locTypes(n), val)
evalStack := evalStack′
pc := pc + 1
Execute(op) → let (evalStack′, vals) = split(evalStack, opNo(op)) in
if ¬exceptionCase(op, vals) then
let val = opResVal(op, vals) in
evalStack := evalStack′ · [val]
pc := pc + 1
Cond(op, target) → let (evalStack′, vals) = split(evalStack, opNo(op)) in
evalStack := evalStack′
pc := if opResVal(op, vals) then target else pc + 1
LoadArg(n) → evalStack := evalStack · [argVal(n)]
pc := pc + 1
StoreArg(n) → let (evalStack′, [val]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
WriteMem(argAdr(n), argTypes(n), val)
evalStack := evalStack′
pc := pc + 1
Call(tail, , T ::M) → if T = System.Delegate then
let [ref , ref ′] = take(evalStack, argNo(T ::M)) in
if M = Combine then DelegateCombine(T , ref , ref ′)
if M = Remove then DelegateRemove(T , ref , ref ′)
if M = op Equality then DelegateEqual(ref , ref ′)
else let (evalStack′, [ref ] · vals) = split(evalStack, argNo(T ::M)) in
if T ∈ DelegateClass then
if ref 6= null then
if M = length then
evalStack := evalStack′ · [length(invocationList(ref ))]
if M = invoke then
DelegateCall(ref , vals)
else
evalStack := evalStack′
switch := Invoke(tail, T ::M, [ref ] · vals)
CallVirt(tail, , T ::M)→ let (evalStack′, vals) = split(evalStack, argNo(T ::M)) in
evalStack := evalStack′
VirtCall(tail, T ::M, vals)
Return → if retType(meth) = void then
if classNm(meth) ∈ ValueClass ∧methNm(meth) = .ctor then
switch := Result([memVal(argVal(0), classNm(meth))])
else switch := Result([ ])
else switch := Result([top(evalStack)])
Fig. 4. The operational semantics rules.
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execCLR(instr) ≡ match instr
...
NewObj(C::.ctor) → let vals = take(evalStack, argNo(C::.ctor)− 1) in
if C ∈ DelegateClass then
DelegateCreate(C, vals)
elseif C ∈ ObjClass then
ObjectCreate(C::.ctor, vals)
else ValueClassCreate(C::.ctor, vals)
LoadField(T , C::F) → let (evalStack′, [val]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
if val 6= null then
let val′ = memVal(fieldAdr(val, C::F), T ) in
evalStack := evalStack′ · [val′]
pc := pc + 1
StoreField(T , C::F) → let (evalStack′, [val, val′]) = split(evalStack, 2) in
if val 6= null then
WriteMem(fieldAdr(val, C::F), T , val′)
evalStack := evalStack′
pc := pc + 1
LoadLocA(n) → evalStack := evalStack · [locAdr(n)]
pc := pc + 1
LoadArgA(n) → evalStack := evalStack · [argAdr(n)]
pc := pc + 1
LoadFieldA( , C::F)→ let (evalStack′, [val]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
if val 6= null then
evalStack := evalStack′ · [fieldAdr(val, C::F)]
pc := pc + 1
LoadInd(T ) → let (evalStack′, [adr]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
if validAdr(adr) then
evalStack := evalStack′ · [memVal(adr, T )]
pc := pc + 1
StoreInd(T ) → let (evalStack′, [adr, val]) = split(evalStack, 2) in
if validAdr(adr) then
WriteMem(adr, T , val)
evalStack := evalStack′
pc := pc + 1
Box(T ) → let (evalStack′, [val]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
let ref = NewBox(val, T ) in
evalStack := evalStack′ · [ref ]
pc := pc + 1
Unbox(T ) → let (evalStack′, [ref ]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
if ref 6= null ∧ T = actualTypeOf (ref ) then
evalStack := evalStack′ · [addressOf (ref )]
pc := pc + 1
Unbox.Any(T ) → let (evalStack′, [ref ]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
if T ∈ ValueType then
if ref 6= null ∧ actualTypeOf (ref ) = T then
let val = memVal(addressOf (ref ), T ) in
evalStack := evalStack′ · [val]
pc := pc + 1
elseif ref = null ∨ actualTypeOf (ref )  T then
pc := pc + 1
Fig. 5. The operational semantics rules (continued).
The Execute instruction is a ‘‘constructor’’ (abstraction) of several real CLR instructions. The instruction models, for
example, the generic (read: with no specified data type) instructions add, div, mul, and sub, but also instructions performing
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execCLR(instr) ≡ match instr
...
MkRefAny(T ) → let (evalStack′, [adr]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
let tr = new(TypedRef ) in
typedRefAdr(tr) := adr
typedRefType(tr) := T
evalStack := evalStack′ · [tr]
pc := pc + 1
RefAnyType → let (evalStack′, [tr]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
let T = typedRefType(tr) in
evalStack := evalStack′ · [handleOf (T )]
pc := pc + 1
RefAnyVal(T ) → let (evalStack′, [tr]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
if T = typedRefType(tr) then
evalStack := evalStack′ · [typedRefAdr(tr)]
pc := pc + 1
CastClass(T ) → let ref = top(evalStack) in
if ref = null ∨ actualTypeOf (ref )  T then
pc := pc + 1
IsInstance(T ) → let (evalStack′, [ref ]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
pc := pc + 1
if ref 6= null ∧ actualTypeOf (ref ) 6 T then
evalStack := evalStack′ · [null]
LoadFtn(T ::M) → let mp = new(MethPtr, T ::M) in
evalStack := evalStack · [mp]
pc := pc + 1
LoadVirtFtn(T ::M)→ let (evalStack′, [ref ]) = split(evalStack, 1) in
if ref 6= null then
let T ′ = actualTypeOf (ref ) in
let mp = new(MethPtr, lookUp(T ′, T ::M)) in
evalStack := evalStack′ · [mp]
pc := pc + 1
Fig. 6. The operational semantics rules (continued).
conversions such as conv.i4, conv.i8, and conv.r8. The execution of the operation underlying a generic instruction
requires the operands’ types. This is one reason why the values are carrying their types. Given an operator op, the
instruction Execute(op)pops a number opNo(op) of operands from the evalStack. If the operation does not throwan exception,
the result of the operation is pushed onto the stack. The resulting value is obtained with opResVal. The below defined
predicate exceptionCase captures the cases when an exception is thrown. These are the following:
• division by zero for operators of integral types;
• operations that perform an overflow check and whose results cannot be represented in the result type;
• values that are not ‘‘normal’’ numbers are checked for finiteness or div ision / rem ainder operations are executed for a
minimal value of an integral type and−1.
exceptionCase(op, vals) :⇔ divByZeroCase(op, vals) ∨ overflowCase(op, vals)
∨ invNrCase(op, vals)
divByZeroCase(op, vals) :⇔ op ∈ {div, rem} ∧ vals(1) = 0
∧ tagType(vals(0)) ∈ {int32, int64, native int}
∧ tagType(vals(1)) ∈ {int32, int64, native int}
overflowCase(op, vals) :⇔ op ∈ {add.ovf, conv.ovf, mul.ovf, sub.ovf}
∧ (opResVal(op, vals) < MIN(opResType(op, [tagType(vals(0)), tagType(vals(1))]))
∨ opResVal(op, vals) > MAX(opResType(op, [tagType(vals(0)), tagType(vals(1))])))
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Table 8
The considered CIL instructions
Instruction Informal description
Dup Duplicates the top value of the stack.
Pop Removes the top element of the stack.
Const(T ,lit) Loads the literal lit of type T onto the stack.
LoadLoc(n) Loads the n-th local variable onto the stack.
StoreLoc(n) Pops the top stack element, and stores it in the n-th local variable.
Execute(op) Executes the operation indicated by the operator op.
Cond(op,target) Executes op and transfers control to target if op returns true.
LoadArg(n) Loads the n-th argument onto the stack.
StoreArg(n) Pops the top stack element and stores it in the n-th argument.
Call(tail,T ,mref ) Invokes the methodmref of return type T ; the boolean tail indicates
whether the call is tail.
CallVirt(tail,T ,mref ) Calls the late bound methodmref of return type T associated,
at run-time, with an object; tail indicates if the call is tail.
Return Returns from the current method.
NewObj(mref ) Creates a new object, and invokes the instance constructormref with the object.
LoadField(T ,C::F ) Loads the field C::F , of declared type T , onto the stack.
StoreField(T ,C::F ) Stores the top stack element into the field C::F , of declared type T .
LoadLocA(n) Loads the address of the n-th local variable onto the stack.
LoadArgA(n) Loads the address of the n-th argument onto the stack.
LoadFieldA(T ,C::F ) Loads the address of the field C::F , of declared type T , onto the stack.
LoadInd(T ) Loads value of type T indirect onto the stack.
StoreInd(T ) Stores value of type T indirect from the stack.
Box(T ) Converts value of type T to object reference (boxed value).
Unbox(T ) Converts boxed value of value type T to a pointer to its unboxed form.
Unbox.Any(T ) Converts boxed value to its unboxed form.
MkRefAny(T ) Loads a typed reference pointing to type T onto the stack.
RefAnyType Loads the handle to the type embedded in a typed reference.
RefAnyVal(T ) Loads the address out of a typed reference onto the stack.
CastClass(T ) Attempts to cast the top stack element to object class or interface T .
IsInstance(T ) Tests if the top stack element is an instance of the object class or interface T .
LoadFtn(mref ) Loads the (method) pointer associated with the methodmref .
LoadVirtFtn(mref ) Loads the (method) pointer associated with the virtual methodmref .
invNrCase(op, vals) :⇔ (vals(0) ∈ {NaN, +infinity, -infinity}
∧ op = ckfinite) ∨ (op ∈ {div, rem}
∧ vals(0) = MIN(tagType(vals(0))) ∧ vals(1) = −1
∧ tagType(vals(0)) ∈ {int32, int64, native int}
∧ tagType(vals(1)) ∈ {int32, int64, native int})
Example 4.1. In the following bytecode fragment, the instruction Execute(div) (the abstract instruction corresponding to
the real CIL instruction div) computes the result of dividing the first local variable by the second local variable.
0: ldloc 0
1: ldloc 1
2: div
The ‘‘type’’ of the division depends on the operands’ types: For example, the 32-bit integer division by zero throws an
exception, whereas the 64-bit floating division by zero returns the special value NaN (read: ‘‘not a number’’). Therefore,
every value has assigned a tag type. In the above example, the types carried by the values of the first two local variables
determine the exact ‘‘type’’ of division.
Similarly as Execute, the Cond instruction is a constructor of several real CIL instructions, e.g., conditional branch
instructions such as beq, bge, and blt. Given an operator op and a code index target , Cond(op, target)pops a number opNo(op)
of operands from the evalStack. The pc is set to target if opResVal yields true for the operator op and the popped operands,
and otherwise, the pc is incremented by 1.
The value argVal(n) of the n-th argument of the current frame is pushed onto the stack by LoadArg(n). The
instruction LoadArgA(n) loads the address argAdr(n). The instruction StoreArg(n) writes at argAdr(n) with the macro
WriteMem the topmost value of the evalStack.
The Call instruction can be used to call one of the three methods declared by the class System.Delegate, or one of the
two methods added to every delegate class definition, or a regular method.
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Table 9
Allocating object references and addresses
let ref = new(ObjRef ,OC) in P ≡
import ref do
ObjRef (ref ) := True
AllocFields(ref , instFields(OC))
seq P
Returns a reference to a newly allocated object of a given type.
let ref = new(ObjRef ) in P ≡
import ref do
ObjRef (ref ) := True
seq P
Returns a new object reference.
let adr = new(Adr, T ) in P ≡
import adr do
AllocAdr(adr, T )
seq P
Returns the address of a newly allocatedmemory block, sufficient
to hold values a given type.
AllocFields(x, A) ≡
forall T ::F ∈ A do
import adr do
fieldAdr(x, T ::F) := adr
AllocAdr(adr, fieldType(T ::F))
Allocates the instance fields in a given set.
AllocAdr(adr, T ) ≡
Adr(adr) := True
if T ∈ ValueClass then
AllocFields(adr, instFields(T ))
Allocates the instance fields of a value of a given type, stored at a
given address.
System.Delegate’smethod calls. If theCall instruction’smethod token argument is themethod reference System.Delegate::
Combine, two delegate references are popped from the evalStack, and their invocation lists are concatenated through the
macro DelegateCombine:
DelegateCombine(DC, ref , ref ′) ≡
if ref = null then
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [ref ′]
elseif ref ′ = null then
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [ref ]
else let ref ′′ = new(ObjRef ,DC) in
initState(ref ′′) := Init(DC)
invocationList(ref ′′) := invocationList(ref ) · invocationList(ref ′)
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [ref ′′]
If the called method is System.Delegate::Remove, two delegates are popped from the evalStack, and the macro Delegate-
Remove is applied to remove the last occurrence of the invocation list of the second delegate from the invocation list of the
first delegate.
DelegateRemove(DC, ref , ref ′) ≡
if ref = null then
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [null]
elseif ref ′ = null then
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [ref ]
else let L = invocationList(ref ) and L′ = invocationList(ref ′) in
if L = L′ then
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [null]
elseif sublist(L′, L) then
let ref ′′ = new(ObjRef ,DC) in
initState(ref ′′) := Init(DC)
invocationList(ref ′′) := prefix(L′, L) · suffix(L′, L)
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [ref ′′]
else evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [ref ]
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Finally, if System.Delegate::op Equality is called, DelegateEqual determines whether the two delegates on top of
the evalStack have identical invocation lists.
DelegateEqual(ref , ref ′) ≡
if ref = null ∨ ref ′ = null then
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [ref = ref ′]
else let L = invocationList(ref ) and L′ = invocationList(ref ′) in
let val= (length(L) = length(L′)) ∧ ∀i = 0, length(L)− 1 : L(i) = L′(i) in
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [val]
Delegate class method calls. If the method token argument of a Call instruction is the method length of a delegate
class, a delegate instance is popped from the evalStack, and the length of its invocation list is loaded. If the called method is
the invoke method of a delegate class, then a delegate reference, an index in the invocation list of the delegate and a list
of arguments are popped from the evalStack. The macro DelegateCall calls the method in the invocation list pointed to by
the index with the given arguments.
DelegateCall(ref , [i] · vals) ≡
let (ref ′, T ::M) = invocationList(ref )(i) in
let this = if T ∈ ValueClass then addressOf (ref ′) else ref ′ in
switch := Invoke(False, T ::M, [this] · vals)
As a result of the delegate classes translation in Fig. 3, the call of a delegate class Invoke method is regarded as a regular
call.
Regularmethod calls. The instructionCall(tail, T ′, T ::M) takes a number argNo(T ::M)of arguments from the evalStack, and
calls the method T ::M , of return type T ′, with the arguments popped from the evalStack by setting switch to the appropriate
method invocation mode.
In contrast to the Call instruction, the CallVirt instruction’s method token argument is late bound, i.e., the method to be
invoked is looked up dynamically by means of the lookUp function. Furthermore, if the CallVirt instruction finds a boxed
instance of a value type on the stack and is applied to a virtual method inherited from System.ValueType or from an
interface implemented by the value type, and the value type overrides or implements that method, then the boxed instance
is ‘‘unboxed’’ and passed as the this pointer to the implementing method, i.e., the method determined through the lookUp
function. More exactly, the address of the boxed instance is passed as the this pointer. Another difference between the Call
and CallVirt instructions is that the latter cannot have a .ctor as method token argument. However, this detail is omitted
by [1].
VirtCall(tail, T ::M, [ref ] · vals) ≡
if ref 6= null then
let T ′::M = lookUp(actualTypeOf (ref ), T ::M) in
if actualTypeOf (ref ) = T ′ ∈ ValueType then
switch := Invoke(tail, T ′::M, [addressOf (ref )] · vals)
else switch := Invoke(tail, T ′::M, [ref ] · vals)
The Return instruction takes from the evalStack no or one value, depending on the return type of the current method. It
then returns this value (if any) by setting switch to the appropriate method returning mode. Note that if the current method
is a .ctor of a value class, then the value class instance the current constructor has been called for is returned (though the
return type of a .ctor is void).
The NewObj instruction can be used for three purposes: to construct an object (other than a delegate), to construct a
delegate, or a to create a value class instance.
Object creation. If OC is an object class (other than a delegate class), NewObj(OC::.ctor) first allocates an object on the
heap for a fresh reference ref . It sets initState(ref ) to InProgress(OC) and pushes the reference ref onto the evalStack. The
reference gets fully initialized, i.e., initState(ref ) becomes Init(OC), upon invoking the instance constructor object::.ctor
(see the object initialization rules in Section 5.3). It then invokes the constructor OC::.ctor with ref and the arguments on
the evalStack by setting switch to the appropriate method invocation mode. Finally, the reference ref is pushed onto the
stack.
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ObjectCreate(OC::.ctor, vals) ≡
let ref = new(ObjRef ,OC) in
evalStack := drop(evalStack, argNo(OC::.ctor)− 1) · [ref ]
initState(ref ) := InProgress(OC)
forall OC ′::F ∈ instFields(OC) do
let adr = fieldAdr(ref ,OC ′::F) and T = fieldType(OC ′::F) in
WriteMem(adr, T , defVal(T ))
switch := Invoke(False,OC::.ctor, [ref ] · vals)
Delegate creation. If the .ctor reference token argument of the NewObj instruction is declared by a delegate class, an
object and a method pointer are popped from the evalStack. A new delegate is then created and loaded onto the evalStack.
Its invocation list is initialized with the object on the stack and the method reference referred to by the method pointer.
DelegateCreate(DC, [ref ,m]) ≡
let ref ′ = new(ObjRef ,DC) in
initState(ref ′) := Init(DC)
invocationList(ref ′) := [(ref ,methodOf (m))]
evalStack := drop(evalStack, 2) · [ref ′]
Value class instance creation. If VC is a value class, the instruction NewObj(VC::.ctor) first allocates a block of memory
where the new value class instance is stored. The address of the memory block is allocated in the local memory pool locPool
of the current frame. The constructor is then invoked with the address of the allocated memory block and the necessary
arguments (assumed to be on the evalStack). Note that the value class instance is pushed onto the stack upon returning
from VC::.ctor. If the instance were loaded before calling the constructor, it would not get updated through the execution
of the constructor.
ValueClassCreate(VC::.ctor, vals) ≡
evalStack := drop(evalStack, argNo(VC::.ctor)− 1)
let adr = new(Adr, VC) in
locPool := locPool ∪ {(adr, VC)}
forall VC ′::F ∈ instFields(VC) do
let adr ′ = fieldAdr(adr, VC ′::F) and T = fieldType(VC ′::F) in
WriteMem(adr ′, T , defVal(T ))
switch := Invoke(False, VC::.ctor, [adr] · vals)
The instructions LoadField(T , C::F) and StoreField(T , C::F) load and update the value of the field C::F , of declared type T ,
respectively. The address of the field C::F , of declared type T , is addressable through the instruction LoadFieldA(T , C::F). Both
LoadField(T , C::F) and LoadFieldA(T , C::F) pop the topmost value of the evalStack, which is an object reference ref (if C is an
object class) or a pointer adr to a value class instance (if C is a value class). The LoadField instruction computes the field value
withmemVal: It is the value of type fieldType(C::F ) stored at fieldAdr(ref , C::F ) (if C is an object class) or fieldAdr(adr , C::F )
(if C is a value class). LoadFieldA loads on the evalStack the address fieldAdr(ref , C::F ) (if C is an object class) or fieldAdr(adr ,
C::F ) (if C is a value class). The instruction StoreField(T , C::F) takes from the evalStack the two topmost values: The first is
a reference ref (if C is an object class) or a pointer adr to a value class instance (if C is a value class), and the second is a
value val. The instruction stores val at the address given by fieldAdr(ref , C::F) (if C is an object class) or fieldAdr(adr, C::F)
(if C is a value class).
The instruction LoadInd(T )pops the topmost value of the evalStack. This is supposed to be a pointer pointing to an address,
say adr . If adr is a valid address, then the value of type T stored at adr is computed. Finally, the value is loaded on the evalStack.
The instruction StoreInd(T ) takes the two topmost values of the evalStackwhich are supposed to be a pointer pointing to an
address, say adr , and a value, say val. If adr is a valid address, then val is stored at the address adr .
According to [1], to load an object reference, the LoadInd instruction should be used with object as type token argument.
Similarly, to store an object reference, the StoreInd instruction must have object as type token argument.
The Box instruction turns a value type instance into a heap-allocated object ‘‘by copying’’, while Unbox yields the address
of the value type that is already present inside of a boxed object. Applied to a value type, Box copies the data from the value
type instance into a newly allocated object, operation accomplished by means of the macro NewBox. The Box instruction
does nothing if it is applied to a reference type.12
12 In .NET Framework (v1.1) and (v1.0), the Box instruction is only applicable to value types. Upon introducing the generics in (v2.0), the applicability
of Box has been extended to reference types.
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ThemacroNewBox(val, T ) picks up an unallocated address adr from the heap andwrites the top stack value val (assumed
to be of type T ) at the memory block at adr sufficient to hold values of type T . The run-time type, used, for example, by the
instructions CastClass and IsInstance, is set to T .
let ref = NewBox(val, T ) in P ≡
let ref = new(ObjRef ) and adr = new(Adr, T ) in
WriteMem(adr, T , val)
addressOf (ref ) := adr
initState(ref ) := Init(T )
seq P
The Unbox instruction takes from the evalStack an object reference to a boxed object and returns the address of the value
type instance that is present inside the boxed object, assuming that the value type coincides with the instruction’s type
token argument. However, the value pushed onto the stack is a pointer representing the address (given by addressOf ) of the
value type instance embedded within the boxed object.
For value types, the Unbox.Any instruction, unlike Unbox, leaves the value, not the address of the value, on the evalStack.
Moreover, while the Unbox instruction’s type token argument can only represent value types, the Unbox.Any instruction can
also be applied to reference types, in which case it has the same effect as the CastClass instruction below, namely it casts the
object reference on top of the stack to the reference type.
A typed reference is created and loaded onto the stackwith theMkRefAny instruction. The new typed reference, imported
from the universe TypedRef , embeds the pointer which is at the top of the evalStack and the instruction’s type token
argument.
let tr = new(TypedRef ) in P ≡
import tr do
TypedRef (tr) := True
seq P
The RefAnyType instruction takes a typed reference from the evalStack and loads not the ‘‘type token’’ embedded in
the typed reference (as wrongly specified by [1, Partition III, Section 4.21]), but a handle, i.e., an instance of the value
class System.RuntimeTypeHandle corresponding to the type in the typed reference. The handle is obtained by means
of the function handleOf . The RefAnyVal instruction retrieves the address embedded in the typed reference on top of
the evalStack, assuming that the instruction’s type token argument is the same as the type stored in the typed reference.
The instruction CastClass(T ) tests whether the topmost value on the evalStack is of type T . If not, an exception is thrown.
The instruction IsInstance(T ) pops a reference to a possibly boxed object from the evalStack. If the actual type of the object
is a subtype of T , then it is cast to T , and the result is pushed on the stack, exactly as if CastClass(T ) had been called. If the
object is not an instance of T , null is pushed on the evalStack.
The LoadFtn instruction pushes onto the evalStack a pointer to the instruction’s method as a native int value. The
method pointer, imported from the universeMethPtr , is mapped bymethodOf to the instruction’s method token. A method
pointer for a virtual method can be obtainedwith the LoadVirtFtn instruction. This instruction pops an object reference from
the evalStack. It then loads on the evalStack a pointer to the virtual method determined based on the run-time type of the
object reference and the given method. It also sets the function methodOf to map the method pointer into the determined
method reference.
let mp = new(MethPtr, T ::M) in P ≡
import mp do
MethPtr(mp) := True
methodOf (mp) := T ::M
seq P
We now define the submachine switchCLR (see Fig. 7) which is responsible for method transfers, i.e., for invoking
methods and returning from methods. This submachine takes control whenever switch is not Noswitch.
Method invocations. If switch = Invoke(tail,mref , vals), the current frame is pushed onto the frameStack, unless the
boolean tail indicates a tail call, in which case the current frame is discarded. The new current frame is set up through the
below defined macro SetFrame.
The macro SetFrame(T ::M, vals) sets the frame for invoking the method T ::M with the arguments vals: pc is set to 0,
locPool to ∅, evalStack to [ ], meth to T ::M . Moreover, through the below defined macro AllocArgLoc, the arguments vals
are stored at the newly allocated argument addresses argAdr , and ‘‘zeros’’ of the appropriate types are stored at the newly
allocated local variable addresses locAdr . If the invoked method is a .ctor declared by object, the target reference becomes
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fully initialized. This is according to the object initialization rules: An object gets fully initialized when a .ctor of the
inheritance tree’s root is invoked.
SetFrame(T ::M, vals) ≡
pc := 0
evalStack := [ ]
locPool := ∅
meth := T ::M
let zeros = [ defVal(locTypes(T ::M)(n)) | n = 0 , locNo(T ::M)− 1 ] in
AllocArgLoc(argTypes(T ::M), locTypes(T ::M), vals · zeros)
if T = object ∧M = .ctor then
let ref = vals(0) in
let InProgress(T ′) = initState(ref ) in
initState(ref ) := Init(T ′)
The macro AllocArgLoc is defined as follows. For the current method, two lists of types L, L′ and a list of values vals,
AllocArgLoc(L, L′, vals) allocates addresses13 for arguments of the types in L and for local variables of the types in L′ and
then writes the values vals at the allocated addresses. The definition of AllocArgLoc is well-founded, since the sum of the
lengths of L and L′ is equal with vals’s length.
AllocArgLoc(L, L′, vals) ≡
forall i ∈ 0, length(L)− 1 do
let adr i = new(Adr, L(i)) in
argAdr(i) := adr i
WriteMem(adr i, L(i), vals(i))
forall j ∈ 0, length(L′)− 1 do
let adr j = new(Adr, L′(j)) in
locAdr(i) := adr j
WriteMem(adr j, L′(j), vals(j+ length(L)))
Remark 4.2. [1] contradicts itself. On the one hand, it states that the local variables whose declared types are reference
types (so, in particular, also those whose declared types are pointer types) are initialized to null upon themethod’s entry [1,
Partition II, Section 15.4.1.3]. On the other hand, it claims that pointers cannot be null [1, Partition III, Section 1.1.4.2]. The
truth is that the pointers can be assigned the value null, but only in a single case: when the local variables of pointer types
are automatically initialized upon the method’s entry.
Method return. If switch = Return(vals), then, by means of PopFrame, the current frame is discarded, and the new
current frame is set to the topmost frame on the frameStack with the possibly empty list of return values vals pushed onto
the evalStack.
The definition of themacro PopFrame is as follows. PopFrame(k, vals) discards the current frame by returning to its caller
frame the possibly empty list of values vals and by incrementing the pc by k.
PopFrame(k, vals) ≡
let (frameStack′, [(pc ′, locAdr ′, locPool′, argAdr ′, evalStack′,meth′)]) = split(frameStack, 1) in
pc := pc ′ + k
locAdr := locAdr ′
locPool := locPool′
argAdr := argAdr ′
evalStack := evalStack′ · vals
meth := meth′
frameStack := frameStack′
13 All simultaneous allocations, i.e., calls of the macro new, are supposed to provide pairwise different fresh elements from Adr; see [18] for a justification
of this assumption.
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switchCLR ≡ match switch
Invoke(tail, T ::M, vals)→ if ¬tail then frameStack := push(frameStack, frame)
SetFrame(T ::M, vals)
switch := Noswitch
Result(vals) → PopFrame(1, vals)
switch := Noswitch
Fig. 7. The switchCLR submachine.
Table 10
CIL’s verification types
Universe of verification types
VerificationType = Type ∪ BoxedType ∪ {UnInit, typedref,Null}
BoxedType = {boxed(T ) | T ∈ ValueType}
5. Bytecode verification
A global view of the CLR bytecode verification is given in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 concentrates on the verification type
system that we consider. It also states what conditions should be satisfied by the bytecode structure to be verifiable.
Type-consistency checks performed by bytecode verification are specified in Section 5.3. The function used by bytecode
verification to simulate the execution paths through bytecode is defined in Section 5.4.
5.1. An overview of bytecode verification
Bytecode verification is performed on a per-method basis. The verification attempts to associate a valid stack state with
every instruction. The stack state specifies the number of values on the evalStack at that point in the code and for each slot
of the evalStack, a required type that should be present in that slot. Also, in order to decide whether an object reference is
fully initialized, the verification tracks in a .ctor a special type for the this pointer (zeroth argument). Given a method, we
refer to the type of the zeroth argument14 and to the stack state as a type state of the method.
Bytecode verification should simulate every possible control flow path through bytecode and ensure that a valid type
state exists for every reachable instruction. By a valid type state, wemean a type state that satisfies certain type-consistency
checks (see Section 5.3). The verification uses only type assignments and does not take advantage of any values during the
simulation. The verification terminates successfully if all the control paths have been simulated. It finishes unsuccessfully
when the verification cannot compute a valid type state for a particular instruction.
At the beginning of the simulation, the stack state is empty and the zeroth argument type is set appropriately (see
Definition 6.1 in Section 6). For each instruction, the verification checks that the stack before the instruction execution
contains enough slots and these slots are types compatible with the expected types for the instruction. It then simulates
the effect of the instruction on the evalStack and zeroth argument (in case of verifying a .ctor). Any type mismatch on
instruction arguments, evaluation stack overflow or underflow, or any violation of other verification conditions causes the
verification to fail. It then propagates the inferred type state to all possible successors of the instruction. If an instruction is
the target of several branches, the verification has to merge the type states along these branches. The merge for two zeroth
argument types succeeds if the types are the same. The merge for two stack states is executed slot-by-slot: the merged
stack state contains for each entry the supremum, i.e., the least upper bound, of the corresponding types in the stack states.
The simulation algorithm fails if it cannot compute a merged type state. This happens if the two stack states have different
lengths15 or one slot of a stack state has a typenon-compatiblewith the type in the corresponding slot of the other stack state.
While the verification is described above as both computing type states and checking them, we will assume that the
information stored in the type states has already been computed prior to the type-consistency checks.
5.2. The verification type system and bytecode structure
The verification types are depicted by VerificationType in Table 10. A verification type is a CIL type as described in Table 1,
a boxed type described by BoxedType, the type UnInit , the type typedref, the special type Null (used as the type of the null
reference).
For every value type T , there exists a reference type boxed(T ), called boxed type. The value of a type boxed(T ) is a location
where a value of type T can be stored. Only bytecode verification has knowledge of the boxed types. In the bytecode, they can
14 The type of the zeroth argument is relevant only when verifying a .ctor.
15 The situation when two stack states have different lengths corresponds to a program point where the run-time stack can have different heights
depending on the path by which the point is reached; such bytecode cannot be proved correct in the framework described in this section, and must be
rejected according to [1, Partition III, Section 1.8.1.1].
N.G. Fruja / Science of Computer Programming 72 (2008) 176–219 199
only be referred to as object, System.ValueType, or as interfaces implemented by the underlying value type. The type UnInit
is a special type used by the verification (only) to track the type of the zeroth argument of a .ctor.
We define the compatibility relationv for verification types.
Definition 5.1 (Compatible Verification Types). The relation v, for verification types, is the least reflexive and transitive
relation such that
• if T is Null and T ′ ∈ ObjClass ∪ Interface ∪ BoxedType, or
• if T ∈ ObjClass ∪ Interface ∪ BoxedType and T ′ is object, or
• if T ∈ BoxedType and T ′ is System.ValueType, or
• if T ∈ ObjClass and T ′ is a base class of T or an interface implemented by T , or
• if T ∈ Interface and T ′ is an interface implemented by T , or
• if T is boxed(T ′′), T ′′ ∈ ValueType, and T ′ is an interface implemented by T ′′,
then T v T ′.
The following lemma, required for the type safety proof, claims that a pointer type is only compatible with itself.
Lemma 5.1. If T& v T′ or T′ v T&, then T′ = T&.
Proof. Follows immediately from Definition 5.1. 
There are a number of restrictions imposed by [1] on using pointer types in verifiable code. Since the typed references
embed pointers, there are also restrictions in using the type typedref. The restrictions are sufficient conditions for the type
safety result.
Address Of The declared type of a local variable and argument used with the instruction LoadLocA
and LoadArgA, respectively, should not be a pointer type or typedref.
Field Type The declared type of a field should not be a pointer type or typedref.
Return Type The return type of a method should not be a pointer type or typedref.
Tail Call Argument Types The argument types of a method called tail should not be pointer types or typedref.
Box Type The Box instruction should not be applied to typedref.
MkRefAny Type TheMkRefAny instruction should not be applied to typedref.
Basically, all these constraints aim to prevent the existence of dangling pointers, i.e., pointers which outlive their targets.
Consider, for example, Tail Call Argument Types. As the tailprefix shortens the lifetime of the caller frame, passing a pointer
to the caller frame as an argument produces a dangling pointer. This would happen since the caller frame is discarded just
before the tail call.
Remark 5.1. Upon entering a method, the macro AllocArgLoc allocates memory blocks for all local variables and
arguments independent of their declared type, in particular, also for those whose declared type is a pointer type. We took
this modelling decision to simplify the exposition. The restriction Address Of helps us, in particular, to guarantee that the
decision is ‘‘safe’’ in the sense that the address of a pointer type local variable or argument cannot be addressed.
Remark 5.2. As pointed out in [19], Field Type can be relaxed to allow fields of value classes to hold pointers, and yet the
type safety result holds. However, this has a downside: the possibility that every value class may be boxed is lost. If a value
class has at least one pointer type field, then one should not be allowed to box this value class. Otherwise, dangling pointers
could be created, e.g., a pointer in a frame could be stored on the heap in the pointer type field of the boxed value class.
Also Return Type could be relaxed to allow methods to return a special kind of pointers. It is about the pointers that
point to a permanent ‘‘home’’ that still exists after the method returns, e.g., locations on the heap. When being tracked by
the verification, these pointers should, however, be marked distinctly.
There are also constraints on the bytecode structure. [1] states that the following conditions should hold or bytecode
verification will fail. To provide the reader with a complete view of bytecode verification, we list here all the conditions
required by the verification, regardless of whether they are relevant in the type safety proof or aimed to simplify the JIT
compilation.
‘‘This’’ of .ctor There should be no instruction StoreArg(0) in the body of a .ctor.
Tail Call Return Type If themethodmref ′ calls tail themethodmref , then either bothmref andmref ′ have the return
type void or retType(mref )  retType(mref ′).
Tail Call Pattern The instruction following a tail call should be Return.
The first condition guarantees that the this pointer of a .ctor is always pointing to the same location in the heap.
This matters, for example, when checking whether the .ctor is called on the same this pointer (and not on another object
reference) of a .ctor of the same class or the base class (see the object initialization rules in Section 5.3).
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The restriction Tail Call Return Type ensures that the frame of themethod called tail returns a value of the type expected
by the caller frame of the discarded frame (the frame which contained the tail call).
The readermight askwhat the reason is for requiring Tail Call Pattern. Recall that the tail prefix is an optional directive,
which might be ignored when bytecode is jitted. If the prefix is ignored, the caller frame would continue to execute after
the callee’s frame returns. However, because of Tail Call Pattern, the caller frame would immediately (read: in the next
step of the operational semantics model) terminate if the callee’s frame returned normally. Thus, the program will execute
properly even if the caller’s frame was not discarded before performing the tail call.
While ‘‘This’’ of .ctor and Tail Call Return Type are relevant in the type safety proof, Tail Call Pattern serves to simplify
the JIT compilation and is included here for completeness only.
In order to guarantee the type-safe execution of delegates, the verification imposes for a delegate creation the below
specified constraint Delegate Pattern. For this, we need first to define the compatibility relation for delegate classes and
methods. A delegate class is compatible with a target method if the arguments that can be passed to the delegate’s Invoke
method can also be passed to the target method and every value that can be returned by the target method can also be
returned by (read: is of the return type of) the delegate’s Invokemethod.
Definition 5.2. A delegate class DC is compatiblewith a methodmref if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. argTypes(DC::Invoke)(i) v argTypes(mref )(i), for every i = 1, argNo(mref )− 1.
2. retType(mref ) v retType(DC::Invoke) or retType(DC::Invoke) = retType(mref ) = void.
Delegate Pattern A delegate creation, i.e., an instruction NewObj(DC::.ctor) with DC ∈ DelegateClass, should
occur immediately after an instruction LoadFtn(mref ) or after an instruction LoadVirtFtn(mref )
immediately preceded by the Dup instruction. Moreover, DC should be compatible with mref .
Furthermore, no branch target should be within these instruction sequences (other than at the
beginning of the sequences).
As the .NET Framework (v2.0) [20]’s bytecode verification does not track method pointer types, requiring Delegate Pattern
makes the verification’s job possible. It assures that the NewObj instruction used to construct a delegate always finds a
method pointer on the stack. The rationale for the Dup instruction is provided in [1, Partition III, Section 1.8.1.5.1]: It
guarantees that the same object is used as the target object (embedded in the delegate) and to determine the target virtual
method (embedded in the delegate).
Example 5.1. To understand why the target object should be the same as the object used to determine the target method,
we consider the following bytecode fragment which does not obey Delegate Pattern. We assume that the object class OC ′
is a subclass of the object class OC , OC ′ contains an implementation of the method OC::M , and DC is a delegate class.
1: newobj instance void OC::.ctor()
2: newobj instance void OC ′::.ctor()
3: ldvirtftn instance void OC::M(int32)
4: newobj instance void DC::.ctor(object, native int)
Provided that OC ′ implements OC::M , the LoadVirtFtn instruction loads a method pointer to OC ′::M on the stack.
Consequently, the last NewObj instruction creates a delegate with a target object of run-time type OC and the target
method OC ′::M . When calling this delegate, OC ′::M gets invoked on an object of type OC . Therefore, in the body of OC ′::M ,
the this pointer is of run-time type OC , but it is used as being of type OC ′. However, this could lead to memory violations if,
for example, OC ′::M accesses an instance field declared by OC ′.
5.3. Verifying the bytecode instructions
Before simulating the execution of an instruction, bytecode verification checks whether certain conditions are satisfied.
In this section, we formally specify these conditions bymeans of the predicate check defined in Fig. 8. The checks for a single
instruction operate on the stack state evalStackT : List(VerificationType) and, in case of verifying a .ctor,16 on the type of
the this pointer argZeroT : VerificationType. Some of the specified checks do not matter for the type safety proof. They are
required to simplify the JIT compilation. However, for the sake of completeness, we specify all the conditions imposed by
bytecode verification.
Several instructions, e.g., Dup, Const , LoadLoc , push a value onto the stack, but do not pop off any values. In their case,
one has to avoid an overflow of the evaluation stack. More exactly, the number of values on the evaluation stack should
not exceed an upper bound computed by every .NET compliant language’s compiler. For this purpose, we consider the
function maxEvalStack (see Table 11) which assigns to every method an upper bound for the number of elements on the
stack.
16 For technical reasons, we consider the argZeroT component for every method.
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check(meth, pos, argZeroT , evalStackT ) :⇔
match code(pos)
Dup → ¬underflow(evalStackT , 1) ∧ ¬overflow(evalStackT , 1)
Pop → ¬underflow(evalStackT , 1)
Const( , ) → ¬overflow(evalStackT , 1)
LoadLoc( ) → ¬overflow(evalStackT , 1)
StoreLoc(n) → evalStackT vsuf [locTypes(n)]
Execute(op) → evalStackT ∈suf verifOpTypes(op)
Cond(op, target) → evalStackT ∈suf verifOpTypes(op)
LoadArg( ) → ¬overflow(evalStackT , 1)
StoreArg(n) → evalStackT vsuf [argTypes(n)]
Call(tail, , T ::M) → (if tail then length(evalStackT ) = argNo(T ::M)
else ¬underflow(evalStackT , argNo(T ::M)))∧
let [T ′] · types = take(evalStackT , argNo(T ::M)) in
types vsuf paramTypes(T ::M)∧
if T ∈ ObjClass ∧M = .ctor then initCtorCompat(meth, T ′, T )
else argZeroCompat(T ′, T )
CallVirt(tail, , T ::M)→ if tail then evalStackT vlen argTypes(T ::M)
else evalStackT vsuf argTypes(T ::M)
Return → evalStackT vlen void(retType(meth))∧
if methNm(meth) = .ctor ∧ classNm(meth) 6= object then
argZeroT 6= UnInit
NewObj(C::.ctor) → evalStackT vsuf paramTypes(C::.ctor)∧
¬overflow(evalStackT , 2− argNo(C::.ctor))∧
if C ∈ DelegateClass then
let [T , ] = take(evalStackT , 2) in delegateTargetObj(pos, T )
LoadField( , C::F) → ¬underflow(evalStackT , 1)∧
let T = top(evalStackT ) in initLoadFldCompat(T , classNm(meth), C::F)
StoreField(T , C::F) → ¬underflow(evalStackT , 2)∧
let [T ′′, T ′] = take(evalStackT , 2) in
initStoreFldCompat(T ′′, classNm(meth), C::F) ∧ T ′ v T
LoadLocA( ) → ¬overflow(evalStackT , 1)
LoadArgA( ) → ¬overflow(evalStackT , 1)
LoadFieldA( , C::F) → ¬underflow(evalStackT , 1)∧
let T = top(evalStackT ) in initLoadFldCompat(T , classNm(meth), C::F)
LoadInd(T ) → ¬underflow(evalStackT , 1)∧
let T ′ = top(evalStackT ) in
∃ T ′′ ∈ ReferentType : (T ′ = T ′′& ∧ T ′′ v T )
StoreInd(T ) → ¬underflow(evalStackT , 2)∧
let [T ′′, T ′] = take(evalStackT , 2) in
∃ T ′′′ ∈ ReferentType : (T ′′ = T ′′′& ∧ T ′ v T v T ′′′)
Box(T ) → evalStackT vsuf [T ]
Unbox( ) → evalStackT vsuf [object]
Unbox.Any( ) → evalStackT vsuf [object]
MkRefAny(T ) → evalStackT vsuf [T&]
RefAnyType → evalStackT vsuf [typedref]
RefAnyVal( ) → evalStackT vsuf [typedref]
CastClass( ) → evalStackT vsuf [object]
IsInstance( ) → evalStackT vsuf [object]
LoadFtn( ) → True
LoadVirtFtn(T ::M) → evalStackT vsuf [T ]
Fig. 8. Verifying the bytecode instructions.
Table 11
The verification specific functions
Function definition Function name
maxEvalStack : Map(MRef ,N) The maximum number of elements on the stack
verifOpTypes : Map(Op,P (List(Type))) The operands’ types for which an operation is verifiable
A few instructions, e.g., Dup, LoadField, StoreField, require a minimum number of values on the stack. For them, there is
an underflow check.
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overflow(evalStackT , n) :⇔ length(evalStackT )+ n > maxEvalStack(meth)
underflow(evalStackT , n) :⇔ length(evalStackT ) < n
The instructions Dup and Pop require the stack to have at least one value. Additionally, in case of Dup, the duplicated
value should not overflow the stack.
Since the local variables in the verifiable CLR bytecode are zeroed upon the method’s entry, bytecode verification does
not need to check for a LoadLoc instruction that the corresponding variable has been previously assigned. The StoreLoc
instruction requires that the topmost value on the stack is of the corresponding variable’s declared type.
The Execute instruction expects on the stack values of the types for which the operation indicated by the given operator
is verifiable. These types are maintained in the function verifOpTypes in Table 11, which given an operator, returns the set of
lists of types for which the corresponding operation is verifiable. The definition of verifOpTypes can be found in [1, Partition
III, Section 1.5].
Example 5.2. Consider the addition operator add. According to [1, Partition III, Section 1.5], this operator is verifiable for
several pairs of types. For example, add is verifiable for operands of type int32, but also for operands of type int64. The
complete set of type pairs for which add is verifiable is defined through the function verifOpTypes:
verifOpTypes(add) = { [int32, int32], [int64, int64], [int32, native int],
[native int, int32], [native int, native int], [float64, float64] }.
The result type for each possible combination of operand types is defined by the function opResType defined in Section 3.
For example, it holds
opResType(add, [int32, int32]) = int32 and
opResType(add, [int32, native int]) = native int.
When executing op, the instruction Cond(op, target) expects on the stack operands of types given by verifOpTypes(op).
Bytecode verification ensures for the LoadArg instruction that the loaded argument’s value does not overflow the stack.
The StoreArg instruction needs the top stack value to be of the corresponding argument’s type.
A Call instruction requires that the argument types, except the type of the this pointer, are compatible with types given
in the signature of the invoked method. A tail call requires the stack to be empty except for the arguments necessary to
perform the call. Concerning the check for the type of the this pointer, we do a case distinction. If the invokedmethod T ::M
is not a .ctor, the type of the this pointer should be compatible with T if T is an object class or an interface, or with T& if T
is a value class.
argZeroCompat(T ′, T ) :⇔
(T ∈ ObjClass ∪ Interface ∧ T ′ v T )∨
(T ∈ ValueClass ∧ T ′ v T&)
For the this pointer of an object class .ctor, there are two special verification rules called object initialization rules:
• A .ctor should not return unless the this pointer is initialized.
• The this pointer is initialized after calling a .ctor of the same class or a base .ctor.
Remark 5.3. The object initialization rules are not necessary for type safety of the bytecode language. The fields initialization
with default values is sufficient for that purpose. The rules are important because significantly large parts of CLR’s security
assume consistent object states. Such a state relies, in particular, on constructors being invoked before objects are used and
on base class constructors being invoked before initialization begins.
We now describe the specification of the object initialization rules. For a .ctor, bytecode verification also tracks the type of
the zeroth argument. This is initially set to the special verification type UnInit . An important contribution of our framework
consists in adding this type to the verification type system though this is not mentioned in [1]. The only allowed operations
on an uninitialized this pointer are loading/storing of and into the corresponding instance fields.
If the Call instruction invokes a .ctor of an object class, the type of the this pointer needs to be UnInit and the .ctor is
either of the same class as the caller’s method (which is also assumed to be a .ctor) or of its base class.
initCtorCompat(T ::M, T ′, T ′′) :⇔
T ′ = UnInit ∧
(T ′′ = T ∨ T ′′ is the base class of T )
We illustrate the object initialization rules in Examples 5.3 and 5.4.
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Example 5.3. We consider the following body of a method declared by an object class OC . We assume that OC declares the
fields OC::F and OC::F ′, both of type int32, and the method OC::M .
0: ldarg 0
1: dup
2: ldfld int32 OC::F
3: stfld int32 OC::F ′
4: ldarg 0
5: dup
5: ldc.i4 2
6: call instance void OC::.ctor(int32)
7: call instance void OC::M()
8: ret
If thismethod is not a .ctor, then Call(void, OC::.ctor(int32)) on line 6would not be allowed since this instruction expects
the type of the this pointer to be UnInit . However, this type can only occur in a .ctor. Consequently, a .ctor can be invoked
explicitly, i.e., with a Call instruction, only from another .ctor.
Let us now assume that this method is a .ctor. Initially, the type of the zeroth argument argZeroT is UnInit . This type is
loaded on the evalStackT by the instruction LoadArg(0) at code index 0. Although the thispointer is uninitialized, the loading
of the field OC::F and then the storing into the field OC::F ′ are verifiable. Also, the constructor call on an uninitialized this
pointer at the code index 6 is verifiable. After this call, the this pointer is considered initialized (see Section 5.4 for the
setting of argZeroT ), and therefore, the method return in line 8 is verifiable.
See Example 5.4 for a justification why the call at code index 7 is verifiable.
Note that the object initialization rules are not crucial for type safety. This would be anyway ensured since all fields of
the this pointer are zeroed before the .ctor is run. The initialization rules are important to guarantee certain invariants
(established by the execution of the .ctor) between the instance fields of the same class objects.
For the CallVirt instruction, one has to guarantee that the types of the arguments on the stack are compatible with
the types expected by the method call. In case of a tail call, the evaluation stack should contain no other values than the
arguments of the call.
The Return instruction expects the stack to be empty except for the value being returned (if any). To shorten the
specification of the underlying check, we use the following notation:
void(T ) =
{[ ], if T is void;
[T ], otherwise.
The Return of a .ctor ensures that the type of the this pointer, tracked by means of argZeroT , is not UnInit .
Within a .ctor, the instructions LoadField, StoreField, and LoadFieldA can also be used with an uninitialized this pointer.
The StoreField instruction can, however, store into fields of uninitialized objects if and only if the fields are declared by the
enclosing class (as opposed to the base class).
initLoadFldCompat(T , T ′, C::F) :⇔
(C ∈ ObjClass ⇒ (T v C ∨ (T = UnInit ∧ T ′ v C))) ∧
(C ∈ ValueClass ⇒ T v C&)
initStoreFldCompat(T , T ′, C::F) :⇔
(C ∈ ObjClass ⇒ (T v C ∨ (T = UnInit ∧ T ′ = C))) ∧
(C ∈ ValueClass ⇒ T v C&)
Remark 5.4. In earlier versions of .NET Framework, the object initialization rules for value classes ensured that each value
class instance needed to be initialized by calling the .ctor which was supposed to initialize every instance field. Bytecode
verification of .NET Framework (v2.0) [20] does not check this anymore. [1] is silent in this regard.
Since the NewObj instruction invokes a .ctor after creating a fresh reference, one has to ensure that the types of the
arguments on the stack are compatible with the .ctor’s parameter types. The pushed object reference should not overflow
the stack from which the .ctor’s parameters have been dropped.
We now consider the case when the NewObj instruction creates a delegate, that is NewObj is considered with a
delegate class’s .ctor. In this case, besides a native int value, the instruction also expects an object reference of a type
compatible with the class of the method whose pointer has been loaded by the preceding instruction. Remember that the
constraint Delegate Pattern given in Section 5.2 guarantees that the preceding instruction is either a LoadFtn or LoadVirtFtn.
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As the value class methods require a ‘‘home’’ for the this pointer, the value class instances should be boxed before being
encapsulated into the delegate.
delegateTargetObj(pos, T ) :⇔
if classNm(mref ) ∈ ValueClass then
T v boxed(classNm(mref ))
else T v classNm(mref )
where mref is such that code(pos− 1) = LoadFtn(mref ) or code(pos− 1) = LoadVirtFtn(mref )
The delegate’s .ctor invoked through a NewObj instruction also expects on the stack a value of type native int. This
is used to represent the method pointer which is going to be embedded in the delegate. Bytecode verification of the .NET
Framework (v2.0) [20] does not track method pointer types. Knowing this, the reader might ask how it is ensured that the
native int value represents indeed a method pointer and not an arbitrary native int value. The answer is to be found in
the constraint Delegate Pattern (defined in Section 5.2) which guarantees that a method pointer is on top of the stack.
The LoadInd instruction requires that the top stack value is of a pointer type whose referent type is compatible with the
instruction’s type token argument. The StoreInd instruction expects on the stack a pointer and a value to be stored at the
address referenced by the pointer. The value should be of a type compatible with the instruction’s type token argument
which, in turn, has to be compatible with the referent type of the pointer type.
The Box instruction expects on the stack an instance of the instruction’s value type token. An object reference is required
on the stack by the Unbox and Unbox.Any instructions.
Remark 5.5. [1, Partition III, Section 4.30] says that for the Unbox instruction, the bytecode verification checks whether the
object reference on the stack represents a boxed instance of the instruction’s value type token argument. However, in .NET
Framework (v2.0) [20], this is not checked by bytecode verification, but it is the subject of a run-time check.
TheMkRefAny instruction expects a pointer to the instruction’s type token argument, while the instructions RefAnyType
and RefAnyVal require a typed reference on the stack. The instructions CastClass and IsInstance require an object reference on
the stack. No check is required for LoadFtn. The LoadVirtFtn instruction expects on the stack an object of a type compatible
with the class of the method given in the instruction.
5.4. Computing successor type states
The type state for an instruction at index pos is constrained by referring to the type states of all instructions that are
control-flow successors of pos. In Fig. 9, we define the function succ which, given an instruction and a type state, computes
the type states and the code indices of the instruction’s successors.
For the instructions LoadLoc and LoadLocA, the function succ uses the variable’s declared typemaintained in locTypes. For
the Execute instruction, the result type of the corresponding operation is determined by means of opResType, based on the
given operator and on the operands’ types.
The Cond instruction has two successors. One successor is given by the target instruction to which control is
transferred if the operator given in the instruction returns true. The other successor is given by the instruction following
the Cond instruction. The stack state of both successors is given by the stack state of the Cond instruction from which the
operands of Cond’s operator have been dropped.
If the instructions LoadArg and LoadArgA are applied to the zeroth argument of a .ctor, the succ function uses the
type argZeroT tracked for the this pointer. Otherwise, succ uses the argument’s declared type recorded in argTypes.
If the Call instruction is applied to a .ctor, the type tracked for the zeroth argument (assumed to be UnInit) becomes the
type denoted by the class of the current method (this update of argZeroT and the definition of initCtorCompat ensure that no
constructor can be further called on the initialized this pointer). Also, all occurrences of UnInit in evalStackT are replaced
by the fully initialized type, i.e., the class of the current method.
Example 5.4. Consider again the method body given in Example 5.3. Before the constructor call at code index 6, argZeroT
is UnInit , and the stack state evalStackT is [UnInit,UnInit]. After the constructor call,
• evalStackT is set to [OC] since UnInit is replaced by OC (therefore, the call at code index 7 is verifiable) and
• argZeroT is set to OC (this guarantees that the return at code index 8 is verifiable).
The successor of a CallVirt instruction is defined similarly to the successor of a Call instruction for the case of a non-
constructor method (we mentioned in Section 4.1 that the .ctors cannot be called with CallVirt).
If the Call instruction is used in a tail call, the function succ contains no successors since the current frame gets
immediately discarded. Similarly, the Return instruction has no successors since its effect is to leave the current method.
The type on top of the stack state in the successor of the NewObj instruction is the class of the .ctor given in the
instruction. The successors of the instructions LoadField and LoadFieldA use the declared type of the field given in the
instructions. In our abstract instructions, the declared type is stored as the first parameter in the above instructions.
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succ(meth, pos, argZeroT , evalStackT ) =
match code(pos)
Dup → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · top(evalStackT ))}
Pop → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ))}
Const(T , ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · [T ])}
LoadLoc(n) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · [locTypes(n)])}
StoreLoc( ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ))}
Execute(op) → let (evalStackT ′, types) = split(evalStackT , opNo(op)) in
{(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT ′ · [opResType(op, types)])}
Cond(op, target) → let evalStackT ′ = drop(evalStackT , opNo(op)) in
{(target, argZeroT , evalStackT ′), (pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT ′)}
LoadArg(n) → if n = 0 ∧methNm(meth) = .ctor then
{(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · [argZeroT ])}
else {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · [argTypes(n)])}
StoreArg( ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ))}
Call(tail, T ′, T ::M) → if tail then ∅
else let evalStackT ′ = drop(evalStackT , argNo(T ::M)) · void(T ′) in
if M = .ctor then
let evalStackT ′′ = evalStackT ′ [classNm(meth)/UnInit] in
{(pos+ 1, classNm(meth), evalStackT ′′)}
else {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT ′)}
CallVirt(tail, T ′, T ::M)→ if tail then ∅
else let evalStackT ′ = drop(evalStackT , argNo(T ::M)) · void(T ′) in
{(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT ′)}
Return → ∅
NewObj(C::.ctor) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , drop(evalStackT , argNo(C::.ctor)− 1) · [C])}
LoadField(T , ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T ])}
StoreField( , ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , drop(evalStackT , 2))}
LoadLocA(n) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · [locTypes(n)&])}
LoadArgA(n) → if n = 0 ∧methNm(meth) = .ctor then
{(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · [argZeroT&])}
else {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · [argTypes(n)&])}
LoadFieldA(T , ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T&])}
LoadInd(T ) → if T = object then
let T ′& = top(evalStackT ) in
{(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T ′])}
else {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T ])}
StoreInd( ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , drop(evalStackT , 2))}
Box(T ) → if T ∈ RefType then {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T ])}
else {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [boxed(T ))]}
Unbox(T ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T&])}
Unbox.Any(T ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T ])}
MkRefAny( ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [typedref])}
RefAnyType → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [System.RuntimeTypeHandle])}
RefAnyVal(T ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T&])}
CastClass(T ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T ])}
IsInstance(T ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [T ]),
(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [Null])}
LoadFtn( ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , evalStackT · [native int])}
LoadVirtFtn( ) → {(pos+ 1, argZeroT , pop(evalStackT ) · [native int])}
Fig. 9. The type state successors.
For the LoadInd instruction, we make a case distinction. If it is used in the form LoadInd(object), i.e., for loading an object
reference, the type added to the stack state of the successor is the referent type of the topmost type17 of the current stack
state. If the instruction is applied with a primitive type, this type is added to the stack state of the successor.
The successor of the instruction Box has on top of the stack state the boxed type corresponding to the instruction’s type
token argument. The successors of the Unbox.Any and Unbox instructions have on top of the stack state the type referred to
by the instruction’s type token and a pointer type whose referent type is the instruction’s type token, respectively.
A typedref is pushed onto the stack by the MkRefAny instruction. The RefAnyType instruction pushes onto the stack a
System.RuntimeTypeHandle. The successor of the RefAnyVal instruction has on top of the stack state the pointer type whose
17 For LoadInd, the topmost type of the stack state is assumed to be a pointer type.
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Table 12
The dynamic functions of the bytecode verification algorithm
Function definition Function name
isVisited : Map(Pc , Bool) Visited positions
isPending : Map(Pc , Bool) Not-yet-verified positions
argZeroV : Map(Pc ,VerificationType) this’ inferred type
evalStackV : Map(Pc , List(VerificationType)) Stack slots’ inferred types
OneStepVerification ≡
choose pos ∈ P do
if check(mref , pos, argZeroV pos, evalStackV pos) then
Propagate(pos)
isPending(pos) := undef
else halt := ‘‘Check failed’’
Propagate(pos) ≡
forall (i, argZeroT ′, evalStackT ′) ∈ succ(mref , pos, argZeroV pos, evalStackV pos) do
PropagateSucc(i, argZeroT ′, evalStackT ′)
PropagateSucc(i, argZeroT ′, evalStackT ′) ≡
if ¬ isVisited(i) then
if 0 ≤ i ∧ i < length(code(mref )) then
argZeroV i := argZeroT ′
evalStackV i := evalStackT ′
isVisited(i) := True
isPending(i) := True
else halt := ‘‘Invalid code index’’
elseif argZeroT ′ v argZeroV i ∧ evalStackT ′ vlen evalStackV i then
skip
elseif argZeroT ′ and argZeroV i have a common supertype∧
length(evalStackT ′) = length(evalStackV i)∧
evalStackT ′(k) and evalStackV i(k) have a common supertype,
for every k = 0, length(evalStackT ′)− 1
then
argZeroV i := sup(argZeroT ′, argZeroV i)
evalStackV i := [sup(evalStackT ′(k), evalStackV i(k)) | k = 0, length(evalStackT ′)− 1]
isPending(i) := True
else halt := ‘‘Propagation not possible’’
Fig. 10. The bytecode verification algorithm.
referent type is the instruction’s type token. If the RefAnyVal instruction did not have a type token argument, the type placed
on the stack by this instruction would have been unknown. In this case, the instruction would not have been verifiable. In
contrast, the RefAnyType instruction does not require a type token argument as it always loads a type handle on the stack.
On the other hand, the RefAnyVal instruction has to perform a run-time check.
The instruction CastClass(T ) leaves on the stack an object of type T . IsInstance(T ) has two possible successors: Depending
if the class of the object on the stack is a subtype of T , T or the typeNull are added to the stack state. The instructions LoadFtn
and LoadVirtFtn load onto the stack a value of type native int representing a method pointer.
6. The bytecode verification algorithm and well-typed methods
[1] vaguely describes a bytecode verification algorithm. [21] defines one precisely. We adopt the algorithm from [21].
Its formal specification is given in Fig. 10. The verifier attempts to determine a valid type state for every instruction of a
method. For that, the algorithm uses the dynamic functions described in Table 12. The set V of code indices visited by the
algorithm, i.e., the indices that have already a type state assigned, is defined in terms of the function isVisited. The set P of
code indices that are still to be explored is defined through the function isPending . The indices in P may be revisited with
refined type states.
V = {i ∈ Pc | isVisited(i) = True}
P = {i ∈ Pc | isPending(i) = True}
N.G. Fruja / Science of Computer Programming 72 (2008) 176–219 207
.method public instance void .ctor() cil managed
{
.maxstack 4 argZeroT evalStackT
.locals init (class OC ′ V 0, class OC V 1,
int32 V 2)
0: ldarg 0 UnInit [ ]
1: ldloc 1 UnInit [UnInit]
2: ldloc 2 UnInit [UnInit , OC]
3: ldc.i4 0 UnInit [UnInit , OC , int32]
4: bgt 9 UnInit [UnInit , OC , int32, int32]
5: pop UnInit [UnInit , OC]
6: dup UnInit [UnInit]
7: call instance void System.Object::.ctor() UnInit [UnInit ,UnInit]
8: ldloc 0 OC ′′ [OC ′′]
9: stfld OC OC ′′::F ? ?
10: ret ? ?
} // end of method OC ′′::.ctor
Fig. 11. Example: merging stack states.
Initial constraints. The following conditions should be satisfied in the initial state of the bytecode verification algorithm
run for a methodmref :
V = {0}
P = {0}
argZeroV 0 =

UnInit, if classNm(mref ) ∈ ObjClass \ {object} and
methNm(mref ) = .ctor;
argTypes(mref )(0), otherwise.
evalStackV 0 = [ ]
Initially, the type tracked for the zeroth argument of an object class .ctor (other than that of object) is UnInit . The stack
state is empty upon the method entry.
When propagated, the type states are merged as described in Section 5.1: The types tracked for the zeroth arguments
are merged to the least common supertype, while the stack states are similarly merged, but component-wise (see also
Remark 6.1). We assume that as soon as halt is set, the verification algorithm stops and consequently, the verified method
is rejected by the algorithm.
Remark 6.1. The least common supertype isnot always unique, since an object class or an interfacemay implementmultiple
interfaces. Surprisingly, this aspect is not clarified in [1]. An elegant solution, described in detail by Stärk et al. [22, Section
16.1.2], is to allow finite sets of object types in the bytecode verification process. This approach requires extending the
compatibility relation v to such sets. Two sets are related through the new relation if for every type in the first set, there
exists in the second set a supertype of the type in the first set. This relation could be introduced without harm into our
approach. To keep the presentation simple, we do not consider it here explicitly though the bytecode verification ‘‘merge’’
operationsmutually assume it. Itmust, however, be emphasized that the verifier’s soundness and completeness proofswould
follow absolutely the same lines if sets of object types were introduced in the verification type system.
Remark 6.2. The bytecode verification algorithm terminates. This can be easily shown by taking into account that the size
of V cannot exceed the size of the code array, and with each algorithm iteration
• the current method typing is replaced with one that is ‘‘greater’’ according to the orderv, and
• the orderv is upwards well-founded.
A method typing is ‘‘greater’’ than another method typing if either its domain (the set of labels for which it is defined) is
greater, or it is the same except that at one label the type state is greater.
Example 6.1. To illustrate the merging of stack states, we consider the example in Fig. 11: a bytecode fragment on the left
and stack states on the right. Let us assume that this fragment is the body of a constructor OC ′′::.ctor of an object class OC ′′,
derived from object, which declares a field OC ′′::F of type the object class OC . Moreover, we assume that OC ′ is an object
class that extends OC .
The instruction at 9 is a merge point. More precisely, the instruction
stfld OC OC ′′::F
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is the successor of two instructions, namely bgt 9 and ldloc 0. The stack state after the instruction bgt 9 is [OC,UnInit],
whereas the stack state following the instruction ldloc 0 is [OC ′,OC ′′]. The two stack states cannot be merged since the
verification types OC ′′ and UnInit have no common supertype.18 So, this constructor violates the object initialization rules,
and therefore, it is not considered well-typed. Basically, as the this pointer is not initialized on a flow path to 9, bytecode
verification cannot determine the initialization status at the merge point 9.
If this were initialized before the branch instruction, the stack states would have been [OC,OC ′′] and [OC ′,OC ′′]. As
OC ′ v OC , the two stack states can be merged into [OC,OC ′′], and thus, the constructor would be regarded as well-typed.
We need a characterization of the type properties satisfied by themethods accepted by the bytecode verification. For this
purpose, we introduce the notion of well-typedmethods in Definition 6.1. We say that amethod iswell-typed if it is possible
to assign a valid type state to every instruction of the method. More precisely, a method is well-typed if there exists a type
state family that satisfies certain initial conditions, the type-consistency checks defined in Section 5.3 for all instructions as
well as the relations dictated by execution simulation of the bytecode (see the function succ defined in Section 5.4) and by
the rules for merging type states specified in [1, Partition III, Section 1.8.1.3].
Definition 6.1 (Well-Typed). A method mref is well-typed if there exists a family of type states (argZeroT i, evalStackT i)i∈D
over the domainD which satisfies the following conditions:
(wt1) The elements ofD are valid code indices ofmref .
(wt2) 0 ∈ D .
(wt3) If classNm(mref ) ∈ ObjClass \ {object} andmethNm(mref ) = .ctor, then argZeroT 0 = UnInit . Otherwise,
argZeroT 0 = argTypes(mref )(0)
(wt4) evalStackT 0 = [ ].
(wt5) If i ∈ D , then check(mref , i, argZeroT i, evalStackT i) is true.
(wt6) If i ∈ D and (j, argZeroT ′, evalStackT ′) ∈ succ(mref , i, argZeroT i, evalStackT i) then
j ∈ D , argZeroT ′ v argZeroT j, and evalStackT ′ vlen evalStackT j.
The domainD of the family denotes the code indiceswhich are reachable from the code index 0. (wt1) states thatD consists
of valid code indices only and (wt2) says that the code index 0 is in the domain. (wt3) and (wt4) mention conditions for
the type state of the code index 0. Thus, the type tracked for the zeroth argument of an object class .ctor (other than
object::.ctor) is initially considered UnInit . The evaluation stack has to be empty upon the method entry. (wt5) ensures
that the type states satisfy all type-consistency checks. (wt6) says that a successor type state has to bemore specific than the
type state corresponding to the successor index. In particular, thismeans that the stack state asserted in the successor should
me more specific, but of the same length as the stack state associated in the type state. The reasons for these conditions are
to be found in the definition of the stack state ‘‘merging’’ described in Section 5.1.
Given a method, the bytecode verification algorithm should decide whether it is possible to assign a type state to every
instruction of the method. In the positive case, the algorithm computes a most specific family of type states the method is
well-typable with. Definition 6.2 specifies what we mean by ‘‘more specific’’:
Definition 6.2 (More Specific Type States). A type state family (argZeroV i, evalStackV i)i∈V is more specific than a family of
type states (argZeroT i, evalStackT i)i∈D if the following conditions are met:
• V ⊆ D ,
• argZeroV i v argZeroT i, for every i ∈ V ,• evalStackV i vlen evalStackT i, for every i ∈ V .
7. Type safety
If a method is legal, well-typed and, in addition, the bytecode structure satisfies the restrictions stipulated in Section 5.2,
then several properties are guaranteed to hold at its run-time execution:
Type safety: Every instruction executes with arguments of expected types. The evaluation stack has values of the
types assigned in the stack state and the same length as the stack state. The values stored in the local variables and
arguments are of the types given in the ‘‘local signature’’ and method signature, respectively. The fields of the objects
on the heap have values of the corresponding declared types.
Object initialization: The value of a variable or a value on an evaluation stack refers to an uninitialized object if and
only if the variable’s or evaluation stack entry’s verification type is UnInit .
18 The ‘‘supertype’’ is defined in terms of the compatibility relationv for verification types.
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Bounded evaluation stack: The evaluation stack does not exceed the upper bound specified by the method. No
instruction attempts to pop a value from an empty evaluation stack.
Code containment: The program counter never leaves the code array of the method. In particular, it must not fall off
the end of the method’s code.
To reason if a value is typable with a type, we introduce a typing judgment. As pointed out in Section 3, the values are
tagged. The type of a value that is neither a pointer nor a value class nor a typed reference, i.e., a value that is not tagged
with& or a value class or typedref, is given by the function type. For a primitive type, type simply returns the tag type tagType.
For an object reference, type is given by the function verifType, which, based on the values of initState, assigns to every object
reference its verification type.
type(val) = tagType(val), if tagType(val) 6∈ {ref,&} ∪ ValueClass
type(val) = verifType(val), if tagType(val) = ref
verifType(ref ) = if ref = null then Null
else match initState(ref )
InProgress(T )→ UnInit
Init(T ) → T
The most interesting part of the typing judgment concerns the pointer types and the type typedref: When is a pointer
of type T&? When is a typed reference of type typedref? An interesting part consists in defining what addresses represent
managed pointers, i.e., addresses of managed memory blocks. The key idea is that, if a memory block is allocated to store a
value class instance, then it is considered that also thememoryblocks for storing the instance fields of the value class instance
are allocated. Therefore, we introduce the predicate isAddressInwith the followingmeaning. For two addresses adr , adr ′ and
two types T , T ′, isAddressIn(adr, T , adr ′, T ′) holds if a value of type T is stored at the address adr which ‘‘is an address in’’
the block of memory pointed to by the address adr ′ where a value of type T ′ is stored.
Definition 7.1. For the types T , T ′ and the addresses adr , adr ′, we define
isAddressIn(adr, T , adr ′, T ′) :⇔
(adr = adr ′ ∧ T = T ′)∨
(T ′ ∈ ValueClass∧
∃ T ′::F ∈ instFields(T ′) : isAddressIn(adr, T , fieldAdr(adr ′, T ′::F), fieldType(T ′::F)))
Definition 7.2 introduces the typing rules. The typing is defined with respect to the heap actualTypeOf , the current frame,
and the frameStack.
Definition 7.2 (Typing Judgment). Let val be a value, T a verification type and [fr1, . . . , frk] a list of frames. The typing[fr1, . . . , frk] ` val : T holds if at least one of the following conditions is met:
• T ∈ PrimitiveType ∪ RefType ∪ {UnInit,Null} and type(val) v T , or
• T ∈ ValueClass, val ∈ Map(instFields(T ), Val), and for every T ::F ∈ instFields(T ),
[fr1, . . . , frk] ` val(T ::F) : fieldType(T ::F)
or
• val ∈ ObjRef and there exists T ′ ∈ ValueType such that
actualTypeOf (val) = T ′ and boxed(T ′) v T
or
• T is typedref and [fr1, . . . , frk] ` typedRefAdr(val) : typedRefType(val)&, or• T is a pointer type T ′& and at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(tj-null) val is null, or
(tj-loc) there exists i = 1, k and n = 0, locNo(meth(fr i))− 1 such that
isAddressIn(val, T ′, locAdr(fr i)(n), locTypes(meth(fr i))(n))
holds, or
(tj-pool) there exists i = 1, k and (val′, T ′′) ∈ locPool(meth(fr i)) such that
isAddressIn(val, T ′, val′, T ′′)
holds, or
(tj-arg) there exists i = 1, k and n = 0, argNo(meth(fr i))− 1 such that
isAddressIn(val, T ′, argAdr(fr i)(n), argTypes(meth(fr i))(n))
holds, or
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(tj-field) there exists OC ∈ ObjClass, OC ′::F ∈ instFields(OC) and ref ∈ ObjRef such that
isAddressIn(val, T ′, fieldAdr(ref ,OC ′::F), fieldType(OC ′::F))
holds and actualTypeOf (ref ) = OC , or
(tj-box) there exists T ′′ ∈ ValueType and ref ∈ ObjRef such that actualTypeOf (ref ) = T ′′ and
isAddressIn(val, T ′, addressOf (ref ), T ′′)
holds.
A value is typable with a value class if is a mapping of the value class instance fields into values of the field declared types.
A typed reference is typable with typedref if the pointer embedded in the typed reference is typable with the pointer type
whose referent type is embedded in the typed reference. A pointer adr is typable with T = T ′& if adr is: null,19 the address
of a local variable or argument of a frame (the current frame or a frame on the frameStack), or the address of an object class
instance field of declared type T ′, or the address of a value type in a boxed value on the heap, or an address typable with T
in a memory block pointed to by one of the addresses of the above locations.
Themethod pointers are not treated specially by Definition 7.2 since they are regarded as values taggedwith native int.
It is then immediate that they are typable with native int.
Remark 7.1. Through the definition of the typing judgment, it should become clear why we have to consider the local
memory pool in our framework: Without locPool, the obviously correct typing of the managed pointers to the value class
instances (constructed with NewObj) would have got ‘‘lost’’. It would then have been impossible to prove the correct typing
of the this pointer in a value class .ctor, invoked through a NewObj instruction.
For the type safety proof, we need several lemmas. The following lemma claims that after storing a value of type T at an
address adr of a memory block, sufficient to hold values of a supertype of T ′, the value read at adr is of type T .
Lemma 7.1. Let T and T′ be types such that T v T′. We assume that
[fr1, . . . , frk] ` val : T and [fr1, . . . , frk] ` adr : T&.
Then, after the macroWriteMem(adr, T′, val) is executed, we have
[fr1, . . . , frk] ` memVal(adr, T) : T.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the possibly value class T , using Lemma 4.1. Note that no frame fr i is modified
upon executingWriteMem. This is since every frame carries the local variable and argument addresses as opposed to their
values. 
Let adr ′′ be an address of a memory block, sufficient to hold values of a type T ′′. Assume that, in this block, adr ′ is an
address where a value of type T ′ is stored. Storing a value of type T ′ at adr ′ raises the following concern: Is the value stored
at adr ′′ still of type T ′′? The following lemma addresses this issue.
Lemma 7.2. If T′ v T, [fr1, . . . , frk] ` memVal(adr′′, T′′) : T′′, isAddressIn(adr′, T′, adr′′, T′′) and [fr1, . . . , frk] ` val : T′, then
the execution ofWriteMem(adr′, T, val) preserves
[fr1, . . . , frk] ` memVal(adr′′, T′′) : T′′.
Proof. By induction on the definition of the isAddressIn predicate. The base case of the induction is proved by applying
Lemma 7.1. 
Definition 7.2 does not contain a subsumption rule. However, this can be easily derived: If val is typable with T and T is
compatible with T ′, then val can also be typable with T ′.
Lemma 7.3. If [fr1, . . . , frk] ` val : T and T v T′, then [fr1, . . . , frk] ` val : T′.
Proof. By induction on the definition of `. 
The following lemma establishes that if the address of a value class instance ‘‘is an address in’’ a memory block, then also
the address of each instance field of the value class instance ‘‘is an address in’’ that memory block.
Lemma 7.4. If VC ∈ ValueClass and isAddressIn(adr, VC, adr′, T′), then
isAddressIn(fieldAdr(adr, VC::F), fieldType(VC::F), adr′, T′)
for every VC::F ∈ instFields(VC).
Proof. By case distinction, applying Definition 7.1. 
19 A null pointer can only occur when a local variable, whose declared type is a pointer type, is accessed in its default state, resulted upon the method’s
entry. Given the issue pointed out in Remark 4.2, this typing ensures the typing of such a local variable.
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The following lemma says that the typing is preserved upon pushing new frames. The typing with a non-pointer type
other than typedref is also preserved upon popping frames.
Lemma 7.5. Assume that [fr1, . . . , frk] ` val : T. If fr is a frame, then
[fr1, . . . , frk, fr] ` val : T.
If T is neither a pointer type nor typedref, then
[ ] ` val : T and [fr1, . . . , fri] ` val : T for every i = 1, k.
Proof. In Definition 7.2, the list of frames is relevant only for (tj-loc), (tj-arg), and the typing of a typed reference. However,
in these cases, T is a pointer type or typedref. 
The following two lemmas are required to ensure type safety of dynamically dispatchedmethod calls. Lemma 7.6 relates
the argument types (including the type of the this pointer) of the called method and the invoked one. Similarly, Lemma 7.7
establishes the relation between return types.
Lemma 7.6. If T′′::M = lookUp(T, T′::M) holds for a type T, then the following conditions are satisfied:
1. (a) If T ∈ ValueType, then
• if T′′ 6= T, then boxed(T) v argTypes(T′′::M)(0) v argTypes(T′::M)(0).
• if T′′ = T, then argTypes(T′′::M)(0) = T& and boxed(T) v argTypes(T′::M)(0).
(b) If T ∈ RefType, then T v argTypes(T′′::M)(0) v argTypes(T′::M)(0).
2. argNo(T′::M) = argNo(T′′::M) and for every i = 1, argNo(T′::M)− 1
argTypes(T′::M)(i) = argTypes(T′′::M)(i).
Proof. By Definition 3.4 and (at) in [override/implement]. 
Lemma 7.7. If T′′::M = lookUp(T, T′::M) holds for a type T, then
retType(T′′::M) = retType(T′::M).
Proof. By Definition 3.4 and (at) in [override/implement]. 
We say that a frame contains an object reference ref with the assigned type UnInit if ref is the this pointer for which
bytecode verification expects the type UnInit or ref is in an evaluation stack slot, where the verification expects UnInit .
Definition 7.3. Let fr = (pc∗, locAdr∗, locPool∗, argAdr∗, evalStack∗,meth∗) and (argZeroT j, evalStackT j)j∈D be a call frame
and a family of type states meth∗ is well-typable with, respectively. Let argVal∗ be the function argVal determined based
on argAdr∗. The frame fr contains a reference ref with the assigned type UnInit if one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
• argVal∗(0) = ref and argZeroT pc∗ = UnInit , or• there exists i = 0, length(evalStack∗)− 1 with evalStack∗(i) = ref and evalStackT pc∗(i) = UnInit .
In the theorem asserting type safety of well-typed methods, we prove invariants for frame as well as for the frames on
the frameStack. However, an invariant for a frame fr in the frameStack has to be considered as fr would be the current frame.
But, when fr becomes the current frame, the initialization status of certain object references as well as the evalStack of fr
might have been changed. This remark triggers the next definitions.
Definition 7.4 (Succession of a Frame). Let fr i = (pc∗, locAdr∗, locPool∗, argAdr∗, evalStack∗,meth∗) be an arbitrary frame
in the frameStack = [fr1, . . . , frk]. Ifmref is the method reference of fr i’s callee frame (for frk, the callee frame is frame), the
succession of fr i is defined as follows:
• Ifmref returns a value, say val, with [fr1, . . . , fr i] ` val : retType(mref ), then
(pc∗ + 1, locAdr∗, locPool∗, argAdr∗, evalStack∗ · [val],meth∗)
is called the succession of fr i in frameStack.• If retType(mref ) is void, then the succession of fr i in frameStack is given by
(pc∗ + 1, locAdr∗, locPool∗, argAdr∗, evalStack∗,meth∗).
Remark 7.2. As Definition 7.4 is with respect to a given frame stack, the succession of a frame is uniquely defined (this is
since the corresponding return value is unique).
Definition 7.5 (Succession of Initialization Status). A function initState∗ is the succession of initState for a frame fr in
the frameStack if initState∗ is defined as follows.
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• If fr is immediately followed in the frameStack by an object class .ctorwith the this pointer ref , then initState∗(ref ′) =
initState(ref ′) for every reference ref ′ 6= ref , and initState∗(ref ) = Init(OC), where OC is the object class given by
initState(ref ) = InProgress(OC).
• If fr is not followed by an object class .ctor, then initState∗ coincides with initState.
To show that the CIL is type-safe, we show that the execution of the methods accepted by bytecode verification does not
lead to any run-time type violations. For this, we proceed by proving the following results:
• Run-time execution of well-typed methods satisfies type safety specific invariants (Theorem 7.1).
• Bytecode verification is sound, i.e., methods accepted by the verification are well-typed (Theorem 7.2), and complete, i.e.,
well-typed methods are accepted by the verification algorithm (Theorem 7.3).
• The execution of well-typed methods satisfying the type safety invariants does not lead to run-time type errors.
Type safety invariants. Theorem 7.1 proves that run-time execution of well-typed methods satisfies type safety specific
invariants. Invariant (pc) implies that the program counter is always a valid code index. By (stack1), we know that
the evalStack has the same length as the assigned stack state and will never overflow. That the values on the evalStack are of
the types assigned in the stack state is ensured by (stack2). By (loc) and (arg), we have that the local variables and arguments
contain values of the declared types. In case of a .ctor, the value of the this pointer is of the type assigned in the type state.
Invariant (init)makes precise when a value has the type UnInit assigned in the type state. Invariant (field) ensures that the
values of the fields of an object class instance are of the declared types. That the value type instance embedded in a boxed
value is of the expected value type is guaranteed by (box). Invariant (del) claims that every target object in the invocation
list of a delegate is an object of an appropriate type, i.e., a subtype of the type that declares the corresponding target method.
It also guarantees that the delegate class is compatible, according to Definition 5.2, with the target method.
Theorem 7.1 (Type Safety Invariants). Let [fr′1, . . . , fr′k−1] be the frameStack and frk be the current frame. For every i = 1, k−1,
we denote by fri the succession of fr
′
i .
We assume that the type system and the bytecode structure of the methods in (fri)i satisfy the conditions stated in Section 5.2.
Moreover, we assume that all methods of (fri)ki=1 are well-typed.
Let fri = (pc∗, locAdr∗, , argAdr∗, evalStack∗,meth∗) be one of the frames (fri)ki=1. We denote by locVal∗ and argVal∗ the
functions locVal and argVal derived based on locAdr∗ and argAdr∗, respectively. If fri is the current frame, we consider initState∗
to be the current initialization status initState. If fri is not the current frame, we denote by initState
∗ the succession of initState
for fri. Let (argZeroTj, evalStackTj)j∈D be a family of type states meth∗ is well-typable with.
The following invariants are satisfied at run-time for every frame fri (for the current frame, frk, invariants (stack1) and (stack2)
should only hold if switch = Noswitch):
(pc) pc∗ ∈ D .
(stack1) length(evalStack∗) = length(evalStackTpc∗) and length(evalStackTpc∗) ≤ maxEvalStack(meth∗).
(stack2) [fr1, . . . , fri] ` evalStack∗(j) : evalStackTpc∗(j), for every j = 0, length(evalStack∗)− 1.
(loc) [fr1, . . . , fri] ` locVal∗(n) : locTypes(meth∗)(n), for every n = 0, locNo(meth∗)− 1.
(arg) If classNm(meth∗) ∈ ObjClass and methNm(meth∗) = .ctor, then it holds [fr1, . . . , fri] ` argVal∗(0) : argZeroTpc∗ ;
otherwise, [fr1, . . . , fri] ` argVal∗(0) : argTypes(meth∗)(0). Moreover, if argNo(meth∗) ≥ 2, then [fr1, . . . , fri] `
argVal∗(n) : argTypes(meth∗)(n) for every n = 1, argNo(meth∗)− 1.
(init) If fri contains ref ∈ ObjRef with the assigned type UnInit, then meth∗ is an object class .ctor (not of class object),
argVal∗(0) is ref, and initState∗(ref) = InProgress(OC), where OC is an object class such that OC  classNm(meth∗).
(field) If ref ∈ ObjRef is such that actualTypeOf(ref) = OC, where OC ∈ ObjClass, and OC′::F ∈ instFields(OC) has the
declared type T, then
[ ] ` memVal(fieldAdr(ref,OC′::F), T)) : T
(box) If ref ∈ ObjRef is such that actualTypeOf(ref) = T, where T ∈ ValueType, then
[ ] ` memVal(addressOf(ref), T)) : T
(del) If ref ∈ ObjRef is such that actualTypeOf(ref) = DC, where DC ∈ DelegateClass, then the following hold for every
(ref′, T::M) ∈ invocationList(ref):
• ref′ ∈ ObjRef
• actualTypeOf(ref′)  T.
• DC is compatible with T::M.
Proof. The invariants are proved by induction on the run of the operational semantics model defined in Section 4.1.
Base case. In the initial state of themachine CLRL, the invariants for the single existing frame (of the .entrypointmethod)
are satisfied as follows. (pc) holds since pc = 0 and 0 ∈ D (from Definition 6.1 (wt2)). The invariants (stack1) and (stack2)
follow from evalStack = [ ] and Definition 6.1 (wt4). Upon the method’s entry, the virtual machine stores, by means
of WriteMem, ‘‘zeros’’ of the appropriate types at the local variable addresses locAdr . By this and Lemma 7.1, we derive
the invariant (loc). The other invariants obviously hold.
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Induction step. We assume that all invariants are satisfied in the current state of CLRL, and we prove that invariants are
preserved after CLRL executes a step. Different cases have to be considered depending on code(pc). For brevity, we only
consider here a few cases.
Case 1. code(pc) = StoreInd(T ).
By (pc) and Definition 6.1 (wt5), there exists evalStackT ′, T ′ and T ′′ such that
evalStackT ′ · [T ′&, T ′′] = evalStackT pc (1)
and
T ′′ v T v T ′. (2)
By (1), (stack1) and (stack2), we get that the evalStack is of the form evalStack′ · [adr, val], where [fr1, . . . , frk] ` adr : T ′&,[fr1, . . . , frk] ` val : T ′′ and
[fr1, . . . , frk] ` evalStack′(j) : evalStackT ′(j) for every j = 0, length(evalStack′)− 1. (3)
Definition 6.1 (wt6) implies
evalStackT ′ vlen evalStackT pc + 1. (4)
When StoreInd(T ) is executed, the new evaluation stack is evalStack′ and WriteMem(adr, T , val) is fired. The invariants
(stack1) and (stack2) are implied by (3) and (4).
None of the real CIL stind instructions defined in [1, Partition III, Section 3.62] has a pointer type or typedref as a
type token argument. Therefore, T is neither a pointer type nor typedref. By this, (2) and Lemma 5.1, we get that T ′′ is
neither a pointer type nor typedref. Concerning the typing of adr , by Definition 7.2, we have that adr is null (tj-null),
or ‘‘is an address in’’ the memory block pointed to by the address of a local variable (tj-loc), or of an argument (tj-
arg), or of an instance field of an object reference (tj-field) or of a value embedded in a boxed value (tj-box), or ‘‘is an
address in’’ the memory block pointed to by an address allocated in the local memory pool (tj-pool). Since all cases are
similar, we only treat here one. Let this be (tj-loc). It means that there exists a frame fr i and a local variable n in the
frame fr i such that isAddressIn(adr, T
′, locAdr(fr i)(n), locTypes(meth(fr i))(n)) holds. Except for (loc) corresponding to the
frame fr i, no invariant is affected byWriteMem (moreover, no frame ismodified byWriteMem). Therefore, by the induction
hypothesis, all invariants except (loc) hold in the next state of CLRL. For (loc), we prove [fr1, . . . , fr i] ` locVal(fr i)(n) :
locTypes(meth(fr i))(n). By Lemma 7.5, we have [fr1, . . . , fr i] ` val : T ′′ since T ′′ is neither a pointer type nor typedref. By (2)
and Lemma 7.3, we get [fr1, . . . , fr i] ` val : T ′. Lemma 7.2 says that the execution ofWriteMem(adr, T , val) preserves the
typing [fr1, . . . , fr i] ` locVal(fr i)(n) : locTypes(meth(fr i))(n), and this concludes the proof of this case.
Case 2. code(pc) = Call(tail, T ′, T ::M).
Subcase 2.1. Let us first assume that the call is tail, i.e., tail = True, and T ::M is not a .ctor. By the invariant (pc) and
Definition 6.1 (wt5), we get check(meth, pc, argZeroT pc, evalStackT pc). Therefore, we have
length(evalStackT pc) = argNo(meth) (5)
and
evalStackT pc vsuf argTypes(T ::M). (6)
The relation (6) follows from the definition of argZeroCompat and the definition of argTypes in terms of paramTypes.
Let [T 0, . . . , T n−1] be the list of argument types argTypes(T ::M). Since the call is tail, we know that none of (T j)n−1j=0 is a
pointer type or typedref (see the constraints in Section 5.2).
The relation (5) implies that evalStackT pc should have the length n. We then derive that the following holds for
every j = 0, n − 1: evalStackT pc(j) v T j. The invariants (stack1) and (stack2) ensure that the evalStack contains the
values [val0, . . . , valn−1] such that [fr1, . . . , frk] ` valj : evalStackT pc(j), for j = 0, n − 1. By Lemma 7.3, we get[fr1, . . . , frk] ` valj : T j, for j = 0, n− 1. By this and Lemma 7.5, we have
[fr1, . . . , frk−1] ` valj : T j for every j = 0, n− 1 (7)
since no (T j)n−1j=0 is a pointer type or typedref.
When the Call instruction is executed, the current frame frk is discarded and not pushed onto the frameStack. The
semantics model CLRL does one intermediate step between the time the Call instruction is encountered and the set up
of the new current frame. This step consists in updating evalStack to [ ] and switch to Invoke(True, T ::M, (valj)n−1j=0 ). After
these updates are fired, (stack1) and (stack2) do not hold anymore since evalStackT pc remained unchanged, whereas
evalStack became [ ]. However, as switch is not Noswitch, one does not have to prove these invariants. Actually, the theorem
does not claim that these invariants hold when switch 6= Noswitch since the above intermediate step is amodel specific step,
which cannot be observed in the runs of the real CLR (note that switch is a model specific global variable). In other words,
no run-time errors can occur when switch is not Noswitch.
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After the intermediate step, the new current frame, maintained in frame, is defined as follows: the pc is 0, the evalStack
is [ ], the local variables hold ‘‘zeros’’ of the appropriate types, and the arguments are (valj)n−1j=0 .
The invariants (pc), (stack1) and (stack2) trivially hold for the new current frame. Upon themethod’s entry, aWriteMem
is executed (by means of the macro AllocArgLoc) to write the values (valj)n−1j=0 to argAdr . By (7) and Lemma 7.5, we have[fr1, . . . , frk−1, frame] ` valj : T j, for j = 0, n− 1. It then follows from Lemma 7.1 that (arg) holds for frame.
After setting the new current frame, the callee’s frame of fr ′k−1 is the frame for executing T ::M and not the previously
discarded frame. Therefore, we also have to show the invariant (stack2) for the new succession of fr ′k−1. If the return type T
′
of T ::M is void, (stack2) follows from the induction hypothesis. If T ′ is not void, let val be the return value assumed to
satisfy [fr1, . . . , frk−1] ` val : retType(T ::M). From Section 5.2, we know that retType(T ::M) v retType(meth). By this and
Lemma 7.3, we get [fr1, . . . , frk−1] ` val : retType(meth). The invariant (stack2) follows then from the induction hypothesis,
Definition 6.1 (wt6), and Lemma 7.3.
Subcase 2.2. Let us suppose that the call is not tail, T is an object class, and M is a .ctor. In this case, the return
type T ′ is void. By the induction hypothesis (pc) and Definition 6.1 (wt5), there exists evalStackT ′, T ′′, and L such that
evalStackT ′ · [T ′′] · L = evalStackT pc , L vsuf paramTypes(T ::.ctor), and initCtorCompat(meth, T ′′, T ). By the definition
of initCtorCompat , we obtain T ′′ = UnInit and either classNm(meth) = T or T is the base class of classNm(meth). The
invariant (arg) ensures that there exists on the evalStack a reference ref typable with UnInit . By (init), we get that meth is
a .ctor (not of class object), ref = argVal(0), and initState(ref ) = InProgress(OC), where OC is an object class such that
OC  classNm(meth). For the current frame, it only remains to prove (init) since the other invariants can be provedwith the
same arguments as in case of a tail call (Subcase 2.1). The invariant (init) is preserved since initState(ref ) = InProgress(OC)
and OC  T .
We also need to show the invariants for every succession of the topmost frame frk, i.e., the current frame before doing
the call, and every succession of the initialization status initState. In the succession of frk, the pc is incremented by 1.
In the succession of the initialization status for frk, initState(ref ) is set to Init(OC), where the reference ref is given by
ref = argVal(frk)(0). By (pc) and the definition of succ in Fig. 9, we get that
(pc + 1, classNm(meth), evalStackT ′′ ◦ [classNm(meth)/UnInit])
is an element of the set succ(meth, pc, argZeroT pc, evalStackT pc), where the list evalStackT
′′ is given by drop(evalStackT pc,
argNo(T ::.ctor)). By Definition 6.1 (wt6), we can deduce that classNm(meth) v argZeroT pc+1 and
evalStackT ′′ ◦ [classNm(meth)/UnInit] vlen evalStackT pc+1. (8)
We have to show the invariant (stack2) for the succession of frk. By the induction hypothesis, from (init) we know that
if there is on the evaluation stack a value val typable with UnInit , then val = argVal(frk)(0) = ref . Furthermore, in the
succession, initState(val) = Init(OC), where OC  classNm(meth). The invariant (stack2) follows then from the induction
hypothesis, (8), Definition 7.2, and Lemma 7.3.
Case 3. code(pc) = Return.
From (pc) and Definition 6.1 (wt5), we obtain
evalStackT pc vlen void(retType(meth)) and argZeroT pc 6= UnInit
if themethodmeth is a .ctorother than object::.ctor. Upon executing theReturn instruction, the current frame is discarded,
and the topmost frame on the frameStack becomes the new current frame. The pc of the current frame is incremented by 1.
Ifmeth returns a value, say val, this value is pushed onto the new evalStack. By (stack2) and Lemma 7.3, [fr1, . . . , frk] ` val :
retType(meth). By the constraints stated in Section 5.2, retType(meth) is neither a pointer type nor typedref. By Lemma 7.5,
we get
[fr1, . . . , frk−1] ` val : retType(meth). (9)
So, after executing Return, the new current frame is exactly frk−1, i.e., the succession of fr ′k−1 according to Definition 7.4.
The current initState does not change after executing Return. If Return does not correspond to a .ctor, then initState is
obviously the succession of itself for the frame frk−1 according to Definition 7.5. If Return corresponds to a .ctor, then,
by argZeroT pc 6= UnInit and (arg), we get that initState(argVal(0)) cannot be an InProgress value. Therefore, initState is the
succession of itself for fr ′k−1 according to Definition 7.5. Therefore, the induction hypothesis and (9) imply that the invariants
also hold after executing Return.
Case 4. code(pc) = MkRefAny(T ).
We get evalStackT vsuf [T&] from the invariant (pc) and Definition 6.1 (wt5). The instruction pops the top value of
the evalStack. Since this value is supposed to be a pointer, let us denote it by adr . By evalStackT vsuf [T&], (stack1),
and (stack2), we have that adr is a pointer typed with T&. Formally,
[fr1, . . . , frk] ` adr : T&. (10)
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The instruction then pushes a typed reference, say tr , onto evalStack. It also sets the functions typedRefAdr and typedRefType
as follows:
typedRefAdr(tr) = adr and typedRefType(tr) = T .
We need to show that the invariant (stack2) is preserved. From the definition of succ in Fig. 9, we have that (pc +
1, argZeroT pc, pop(evalStackT pc) · [typedref]) ∈ succ(pc, argZeroT pc, evalStackT pc). From Definition 6.1 (wt6), we obtain
pc + 1 ∈ D (where D is the domain of the family of type states for the current frame frk) and pop(evalStackT pc) ·[typedref] vlen evalStackT pc+1. The first condition ensures that the invariant (pc) is preserved. Based on the second
condition and on Definition 5.1, we know that in order to prove (stack2), it suffices to show [fr1, . . . , frk] ` tr : typedref.
This typing follows from (10) and Definition 7.2. 
Remark 7.3. CLRL follows strictly the ECMAStandard [1] and consequently considers that the tailprefix cannot be ignored.
The semantics model, bytecode verification and the proof could be, however, easily adapted to take into account the aspect
that the prefix can be ignored (when jitting). Thus, in the definition of succ , the tail calls would be treated as regular calls.
More precisely, the tail call would be considered as having a successor (namely a Return instruction — see Tail Call Pattern),
as opposed to the actual definition of succ which does not define any successors. That the invariants are preserved upon
performing a tail call with the tail prefix ignored would be proved as in the case of a regular call.
It is worth mentioning that the restriction Tail Call Return Type would become redundant upon redefining the
function succ for tail calls. Given that we only deal with well-typed methods, the above restriction would follow from Tail
Call Pattern.
Bytecode verification’s soundness and completeness. Well-typed methods’ type safety alone is, however, not sufficient.
We also need to show that (1) themethods accepted by the verification algorithm arewell-typed, and (2) if amethod iswell-
typed, then it is accepted by the verification algorithm and the algorithm computes a most specific family of type states. In
other words, we have to prove the soundness and the completeness of the verification algorithm. These proofs require the
following lemmas: Lemmas 7.8 and 7.9 claim that the type checks and successors are monotonic, respectively.
Lemma 7.8 (Monotonicity of Checks). Let mref and pos be a method and a code index of an instruction of mref, respectively. If
argZeroT′ v argZeroT, evalStackT′ vlen evalStackT, then
check(mref, pos, argZeroT, evalStackT)→ check(mref, pos, argZeroT′, evalStackT′).
Proof. By a case distinction on the instruction code(mref )(pos). The transitivity ofv and Lemma 5.1 are applied. 
Lemma 7.9 (Monotonicity of Successors). Let mref be a method and pos a code index of a bytecode instruction of mref. Let us
assume that we have argZeroT′ v argZeroT, evalStackT′ vlen evalStackT and check(mref, pos, argZeroT, evalStackT). Then for
every
(j, argZeroT′′′, evalStackT′′′) ∈ succ(mref, pos, argZeroT′, evalStackT′)
there exists (j, argZeroT′′, evalStackT′′) ∈ succ(mref, pos, argZeroT, evalStackT) such that
argZeroT′′′ v argZeroT′′ and evalStackT′′′ vlen evalStackT′′.
Proof. By a case distinction on the instruction code(mref )(pos). The transitivity ofv is used. 
Theorem 7.2 (Soundness of the Verification Algorithm). During bytecode verification of mref, the following conditions are met:
(bv1) P ⊆ V and the elements of V are valid code indices of mref.
(bv2) 0 ∈ V .
(bv3) If classNm(mref) ∈ ObjClass \ {object} and methNm(mref) = .ctor, then argZeroV0 = UnInit. Otherwise, argZeroV0 =
argTypes(mref)(0).
(bv4) evalStackV0 = [ ].
(bv5) If i ∈ V \ P , then check(mref, i, argZeroVi, evalStackVi) is true.
(bv6) If i ∈ V \ P and (j, argZeroV′, evalStackV′) ∈ succ(mref, i, argZeroVi, evalStackVi) then j ∈ V , argZeroV′ v argZeroVj
and evalStackV′ vlen evalStackVj.
Proof. By induction on the run of the bytecode verification algorithm in Fig. 10. 
One can easily notice that, for P = ∅, the conditions (bv1)–(bv6) correspond to the well-typedness constraints (wt1)–
(wt6) in Definition 6.1. So, if a method is accepted by verification (in particular, this means that the verification algorithm
terminated, i.e., P = ∅), then the method is well-typed.
Theorem 7.3 (Completeness of the Verification Algorithm). If the method mref is well-typable with a type state fam-
ily (argZeroTi, evalStackTi)i∈D , then, during the verification of mref’s bytecode, the family (argZeroT′i, evalStackT
′
i)i∈V is always
more specific than (argZeroTi, evalStackTi)i∈D and halt is not set (to a verification error).
216 N.G. Fruja / Science of Computer Programming 72 (2008) 176–219
Proof. By induction on the run of the verification algorithm in Fig. 10, where Lemmas 7.8 and 7.9 and Definition 6.2 are
applied. 
Type-safe run-time execution. The satisfaction of the type safety invariants, mostly defined in terms of the typing
judgment `, is not sufficient. The typing judgment could have been wrongly defined such that the invariants trivially hold.
In such a case, the satisfaction of the invariants would be worthless. Therefore, we need to show that the execution of the
methods accepted by bytecode verification is free of run-time type errors. This follows from (1) the fact that the methods
accepted by bytecode verification are well-typed methods (Theorem 7.2) and (2) the fact that the execution of well-typed
methods satisfies the type safety invariants (Theorem 7.1).
Let mref be a method accepted by bytecode verification. Let (argZeroT j, evalStackT j)j∈D be a family of type states
mref is well-typable with. By Theorem 7.1, the type safety invariants hold. Let argZeroT ′ and evalStackT ′ be the type
assignment associated at run-time to the this pointer and the evaluation stack, i.e., the assignment determined through the
function type. By (stack1), (stack2), and (arg), we can get that argZeroT ′ v argZeroT pc and evalStackT ′ vlen evalStackT pc .
As the verification checks are monotonic (Lemma 7.8) and check(mref , pc, argZeroT pc, evalStackT pc) is true (mref is well-
typed), we can deduce that check(mref , pc, argZeroT ′, evalStackT ′) is true as well. This means that the types associated with
the run-time values satisfy the type checks described by the predicate check, i.e., the execution does not lead to any run-time
type errors.
8. Related work
Sections 8.1 and 8.2 survey the literature on CIL’s formal studies, in particular type safety proofs, and the closely related
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [23]’s type safety, respectively. The application of the ASM method for the specification of
programming languages and their implementation is briefly reviewed in Section 8.3.
8.1. The CIL
Regarding CIL’s type safety, there is only one publicationwe are aware of: Gordon and Syme have developed a type system
for a small fragment of CIL, named Baby IL (BIL) [19]. We provide below a detailed comparison between their paper and our
work.
Themain theoremproved by Gordon and Syme [19], based upon Syme’smethod [24] forwriting functional specifications
(subject to theorem proving in HOL), asserts soundness of the BIL’s type system and not the soundness of bytecode
verification. Being focused on the type system, they develop simple evaluation rules, in a big-step style of operational
semantics [25]. This approach has, however, some drawbacks. For example, it seems to be impossible to determine in their
framework if and when a location (e.g., a field or argument) is initialized.
Unlike [19], our framework involves a complete (with respect to the considered bytecode language) semantics model,
which represents an important by-product of this paper. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first that defines a
semantics model for a subset of the verifiable CIL bytecode.
We briefly mention here the most important aspects omitted in their formal specifications:
• local variables: As Gordon and Syme do not provide a formal description for a method frame, leaving out local variables
simplifies considerably their approach. As we have seen in Definition 7.2, considering local variables increases the
complexity of the typing judgment the type safety proof highly relies on.
• arithmetic operations: For the semantics of the arithmetic operations, our framework reflects the implementation of the
real CLR, where the evaluation stack is strongly typed. Accordingly, we consider the values to be tagged (see Section 3). As
Gordon and Syme abstract away from any details concerning the evaluation stack, the importance of a typed evaluation
stack cannot be spotted in their framework.
• typed references: Since typed references embed pointers, the verification has to treat them prudently in order to avoid
dangling pointers. It is not immediately obvious whether the restrictions imposed in Section 5.2 guarantee the type-safe
execution of programs with typed references.
• tail method calls: Tail calls require care, because the verification has to prevent pointers to the current frame being passed
as arguments. It is not straightforward at all whether the constraints on the bytecode structure defined Section 5.2 ensure
type-safe tail calls.
• delegates: BIL does not include method pointers. Therefore, delegates, i.e., the feature that allows for type-safe method
pointers, are not treated either. As [19] does not specify the program counter pc , it is not clear whether [19]’s approach
can be easily adjusted to specify, for example, the constraint Delegate Pattern in Section 5.2. Moreover, BIL would need
to be considerably extended (e.g., Dup, LoadFtn, LoadVirtFtn, branch instructions) to cover the delegate handling.
• boxed types and interfaces: Although BIL includes instructions for boxing and unboxing, [19], contrary to [1], does not
include boxed types. Moreover, without considering boxed types, [19]’s approach does not seem to be flexible enough
to include interfaces.
The subtleties of the local memory pool are avoided by [19]’s framework. Actually, they cannot be spotted as long as
the typing of the this pointer of a .ctor is not an issue in [19]. This is the case since the .ctors considered in [19] are
oversimplified and do not have a this pointer.
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Another important drawback of [19]’s type system is that it does not analyze the special initialization rules for objects. In
this sense, one of ourmerits is the extension of the verification type systemby the typeUnInit , though [1, Partition III, Section
1.8.1.2.1] does not mention it. Another important contribution of our framework is augmenting bytecode verification with
the argZeroT component to track type information concerning the initialization status of object references. As BIL does not
include the Return instruction and assumes, as originally suggested by [26], that each class has exactly one .ctor (which does
not even have a this pointer), it would just not be possible to implement the object initialization rules in [19]’s framework
according to [1]. Recall that a this pointer of an object class .ctor is fully initialized if a constructor of the same class or of
the base class has been invoked.
8.2. The JVM
The JVM is the run-time environment designed to execute compiled Java programs. Considerable research effort has been
devoted to formally specify the JVM bytecode semantics, verification, and type safety; see, for example, [27,28,22,29–36]. A
detailed review of the huge literature can been found in [37]. Of all these publications, thework by Stärk et al. [22] is themost
closely related and had themost impact on this paper. Besides proving Java’s and JVM’s type safety, [22] (following [38]) also
points out a serious problemof the JVMbytecode verification: There are legal Java programswhich are correctly compiled (on
Sun’s JDK (v1.2) and (v1.3) compilers, at the time) into JVM bytecode that is rejected by bytecode verification (of JDK (v1.2)
and (v1.3)). To fix this problem, [22] (following [29]) propose to restrict the definite assignment analysis rules of the Java
compiler such that these programs are no longer allowed. Further, [22] (following [29]) specifies a compilation scheme and
proves that the bytecode programs the Java compiler generates, according to the compilation scheme, from the restricted
subset of valid Java programs pass bytecode verification.
As the CLR is designed to support a large diversity of languages, it is understandable that it deals with many constructs
that do not have an equivalent in JVM, which, despite of several attempts [39–41] to be used as target for languages other
than Java, has been designed precisely with the Java language in mind. The most important CLR features that are lacking in
JVM are the tail method calls, the constructs supporting pointers (including method pointers in the form of delegates), value
classes, boxing, unboxing, and typed references. As detailed comparisons of the two virtual machines already exist [42,43],
we limit ourselves to point out here only a few important aspects concerning the semantics and bytecode verification that
differ in JVM and CLR.
Onemain challenge of JVM bytecode verification, the object initialization verification, is performed differently than in the
CLR. The JVM object creation process is accomplished in two steps as follows. A new reference is created by a new instruction
(which does not have a constructor token argument), duplicated, and passed explicitly to a constructor invocation. One
reference (to an uninitialized object) remains on the stack, and one reference is ‘‘consumed’’ as the this pointer by the
constructor invocation. After the constructor has been invoked, the reference left on the stack points to a properly initialized
object. Bytecode verification is difficult since the constructors operate by side-effect: Instead of taking an uninitialized object
and returning an initialized object, they simply take an uninitialized object, leave a reference to the uninitialized object on
the stack, and return nothing. To find out what references in the current state are ensured to point to the same uninitialized
object that is passed as this pointer to a constructor, JVM verification identifies every uninitialized object by the program
counter of the new instruction that created it.
The CLR gets rid of this problem by adding a constructor token argument to the newobj instruction. Thus, in CLR, the same
instruction creates a new object reference and initializes it by invoking the constructor pointed to by the token argument.
However, in the constructor, the this pointer is considered uninitialized and the CLR verification has to track its initialization
status.
Another important verification issue, the local variable initialization, is treated differently by JVM and CLR. While the
CLR requires that the verifiable methods automatically zeroes the local variables, the JVM bytecode verification performs a
definite assignment analysis and tracks type information for every local variable.
Unlike CLR, the JVM does not have generic instructions. To encode the kind of the performed operation, prefixes are
added to the JVM instructions. For example, the JVM instruction iadd performs the addition of two integers, whereas dadd
adds two doubles.
8.3. The ASM method
This section gives a short critical assessment of the ASM method and provides pointers to publications for further
comparisons to alternative approaches. Besides reviewing the work on JVM’s type safety, [37] also includes an evaluation of
the ASM based investigations. As a broad comparison of the ASM method with respect to other system design and analysis
frameworks has already been done in [44,45], we only point here some advantages of the ASMmethod over [19]’s approach.
With Gordon and Syme [19]’s evaluation rules, it is not convenient at all to model irregular control flows.20 To simplify
the evaluation and typing rules, Gordon and Syme [19] decide to create two instructions which assemble certain branch
instructions. As a result, a syntax for these two constructs is chosen. This technique is, however, not suitable when
20 Note that denotational semantics is not suitable either to model irregular control flows (see [46] for a solution to cope with this issue).
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considering the whole CIL. As Gordon and Syme [19] mention, ‘‘the technique may not scale well to express control flow such
as arbitrary branching within a method’’. In particular, the code containment, i.e., the invariant that pc will always point to a
valid code index, cannot be analyzed, and therefore cannot be ensured in their framework. As demonstrated by this paper,
the exceptionmodel [9] and the genericsmodel [10], the ASMmethod can be successfully applied tomodel irregular control
flows.
Another advantage of using the ASM method is the possibility of validating the corresponding ASM model. Thus, the
model can be refined, made executable by means of an implementation in AsmL [6], and then validated by its simulation.
To validate our operational semantics model, i.e., to test its internal correctness and its conformance to the Microsoft
implementation (v2.0) [20], we have developed an AsmL implementation [12] of our ASM specifications. Furthermore, we
have also validated our specifications for bytecode verification [13].
9. Future work
The formal specifications defined in this paper serve not only as a basis for the type safety proofs, but also as an excellent
starting point for further investigations of various aspects of the CLR. Thus, one can analyze, for instance, stronger safety
guarantees for CIL programs, or ways in which one can optimize programs in a type-safe manner. Moreover, the abstract
structure of the developed framework makes it possible to integrate new algorithms as well as new type systems into the
existing formalization. In this sense, on top of the framework developed in this paper, we have defined formal models for
the semantics and bytecode verification of the .NET exception handling mechanism [9] and generics [10].
Potential future work also includes a few extensions of bytecode verification. As bytecode verification is conservative, it
might reject non-well-typed programs though their execution is type-safe, for all input values. To limit the number of these
cases, we would like to refine bytecode verification. One refinement could be, for example, to extend the verification such
that it also verifies methods whose local variables are not automatically initialized. For that, the verification should perform
a definite assignment analysis. However, as this analysis is very similar to the one performed by the JVMverification (already
investigated in detail in [22]), such a refinement would not be worth too much attention.
Another possible refinement is concerning the method pointers. Thanks to the strong constraint Delegate Pattern,
bytecode verification can check the NewObj instructions which create delegates. This restriction can be weakened by
extending the verification type systemwith an abstract type. This special type would actually be defined as a pair consisting
of the following components: a verification type (as defined before) and amethod signature. The type component of the pair
would be essential when verifying a delegate creation. Thus, for the NewObj instructions applied with delegate .ctors, one
would need to check that the type of the target object on the stack is compatible with the type component and the delegate
class is compatible with the signature component. This extension of the verification type system would also make possible
the verification of the currently non-verifiable indirect calls, i.e., calls via method pointers.
Future work might also encompass a formal study of the .NET security model and its properties. Also, the automatic
verification of the type safety result, widely done in the Java/JVM area (e.g., [47,32]), remains an important challenge for
future research.
10. Conclusion
In this paper, we have formally proved type safety of a large subset of the CIL language to which any .NET compliant
language compiles. The analyzed subset is reasonably rich and contains many features which separately or together might
have led to violations of type safety.
Apart from the carrying out the proof, several by-products of this work constitute important contributions. Among
these are, obviously, the semantics model of the .NET CLR run-time system and the specification of the .NET CLR bytecode
verification. It must be emphasized that all the formal models (that the proof relies on) are not only executable in theory:
We have validated them through AsmL prototypes [12,13] generated from the formal specifications. These executable
specifications constitute an important by-product of this study.
Providing new insights on the semantics and verification of specific CIL language features (e.g., delegates, typed
references, object initialization scheme) represent another contribution. The abstract framework developed here has made
it possible to clarify a number of important aspects which are ambiguously specified or not handled at all by the official
specification of CLR. In this sense, we pointed out and filled several gaps in [1], andwe indicated a number of inconsistencies
between different implementations of the CLR and [1]. It is important to notice that most of the conditions inherited from
the language specifications, in particular even the well-formedness conditions, are actually needed somewhere in the proof.
This inspires, in particular, confidence in the appropriateness of the developed abstract framework.
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